The Army and the General

One of the predictable results of participation in wars is the appearance of "old soldiers." The trouble is that occasionally they become annoying to the Administration. An example is General Matthew B. Ridgway, and no doubt a number of members of the Administration wish the doughty paratrooper would do some fast fading. For behind the petty bickering that reaches the headlines, is the question mark Ridgway has placed next to our present military policy.

Ridgway claims, and most of the high Army brass agree, that we need a large Army, equipped with both atomic and "conventional" weapons. This idea cannot be dismissed as obvious or as mere self-seeking on the part of the generals, although present Administration policy envisions a greater and greater dependence on weapons of mass-destruction and a smaller and smaller Army. Appealing as this may be to high-ranking Air Force officers and prospective draftees, it means inevitably a diminishing ability to handle the possible "brush-fire" wars that threaten sporadically in the Near and Far East. In other words, comes an act of aggression, we will then have to choose between using the atomic bomb (and very likely starting World War III) or backing out. This is high-stake gambling, which depends on the presumption that potential enemies who are as well equipped as we are with fissionable play-things will be deterred.

The view that Ridgway is presenting also is based largely on deterrance, but of a different kind. It envisions a stalemate, in which neither side will want to be first on the atomic draw. It points to the impertinent and yet accurate predictions of the Chinese Communists that they go could provoke us plenty before we would throw an atomic bomb at them. Ridgway's answer is an adequate, up-to-date, highly mobile Army, which, if necessary, can fight and win localized wars. Ridgway and his followers believe that the mere existence of such an Army will deter would-be aggressors from adventures that might end in defeat and humiliation for the Party.

Ridgway fought hard for his position while he was in the Pentagon, but he seems to have lost. Now he is fighting a different battle, which his loyalty to his commandor-in-chief did not allow him to engage in while he was on active duty. He is attempting to get his views before the country. That he do so is all the more essential because Charles Wilson seems to be chopping up the Army and at the same time assuring everyone that the Army is more powerful than ever. The recent redesignation (but not reorganization) of all training divisions as "active" divisions was a blatant example of this practice of misleading the public.

Unfortunately, the press has played up the issue of "political" control of the military establishment. This is not relevant to the present fracas. Civilians do and should have the last word in determining military policy. But before that last word is spoken, every responsible voice should be heard. Ridgway's views should be pondered thoughtfully by those who bear the burden of our security.