Learning to Love the Bomb

It's August, which spells vacation in Washington. Congress is out of session; the President is at his ranch in California; the Supreme Court is in recess. The summer's heat and humidity seem to put all federal business on hold for a month.

The energy-sapping weather seems to have reached all the way to the colder climes of Switzerland. In Geneva, superpower negotiations on nuclear weapons have not screeched to a halt, but rather have come inside from the lazy heat, turned on the air conditioning, and flopped on the couch for a nap. The meetings have been in the doldrums for quite some time now.

In an effort to put the Iran-Contra fiasco behind him, President Reagan has placed a treaty with Gorbachev on intermediate-range nuclear missiles at the top of his agenda. By concluding such an agreement, Reagan believes he can salvage a powerful legacy in foreign affairs; he can be the first President in history to achieve an actual nuclear arms reduction treaty with the Soviets.

Treaties such as SALT have only imposed ceilings on increases in the superpower nuclear arsenals. Proposals for intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) currently on the table would eliminate an entire class of weapon systems, primarily the American Pershing IIs and the Soviet SS-20s concentrated in Central Europe. And we would be getting a bargain in the process, Administration officials argue, because the SS-20s outnumber our Pershings by more than five to one. Both Reagan and supporters of nuclear disarmament welcome an INF treaty with the Soviets.

But our nation's decisionmakers should think twice before they snap up this bargain. Unfortunately, they seem to be judging its value in terms of its historical and public relations value, instead of in terms of national interest and strategic stability. To the Administration, the INF would work toward rehabilitating Reagan's image with the public and with historians, proving that his policy of negotiating from strength worked. Nor would an agreement hurt the Republican party in the upcoming presidential elections.

But would the reduction of medium-range nuclear weapons be in the national interest? In terms of grand strategy, no. In fact, a reduction very likely may harm the ability of America and her allies to defend themselves in the case of a Soviet attack in Europe or Asia. Since World War II, Moscow has maintained--at great cost to its economy and standard of living--massive conventional forces poised for an invasion of West Germany. This build-up is anything but "peaceful" and "defensive"; no country needs three times as many tanks as its enemy to protect herself.

War has not erupted in Europe for the last 40 years simply because the Russians are friendly neighbors. and it has been the American nuclear guarantee that has kept the peace since the beginnings of the superpower rivalry. NATO has used its powerful strategic and tactical nuclear arsenal to make up for its deficiency in conventional arms. For the Soviets, the fewer nuclear devices in Europe, the better.

Although the removal of Pershings and cruise missiles would not seriously handicap NATO's nuclear strike ability, the implications of an INF treaty go beyond tactical effects. The first successful disarmament treaty--as opposed to an arms control treaty such as SALT--could easily bring about, in its wake, the negotiated elimination of other nuclear weapons in Europe such as those carried by bombers or fired by artillery. An INF treaty holds out the possibility of the "denuclearization" of Europe, which would remove the West's check on Soviet conventional superiority on the continent.

An INF treaty could also prove disruptive for the NATO alliance itself. The dispute over the West German-controlled force of older Pershing missiles already underscores this problem.

NATO governments invested a great deal of political capital persuading their peoples to allow the installation of the Pershings and Tomahawks on their soil. Now the Americans have turned about and decided to remove them. Not only do the European governments look foolish, but they have the additional fear of further American force withdrawals from NATO.

In the minds of European leaders, INF could be the first indication of a renewed isolationist feeling in a United States that they have never trusted completely to keep its promise and defend them. America may decide to de-couple itself from the defense of the West--a prospect feared by foreign ministers for the last 40 years--and leave West Europeans at the mercy of the Soviet Union.

Some protest that the Soviets would never invade Europe, even without the presence of nuclear weapons or American troops on Western soil. That may or may not be true; they have never before been given the opportunity.

Nevertheless, the Soviets could still apply their conventional superiority to other tasks. In crises between the Soviet Union and the United States or Western Europe, Moscow could use the military threat of invasion to coerce NATO into backing down, politically. One need only remember the Berlin crises of the 1960s for an example of Soviet tanks not on manuevers.

If an INF agreement were settled, the United States' only option for shielding the continent from Soviet coercion would be a rapid buildup in conventional forces. However ideal, this option would be impractical considering the country's already strained fiscal resources. Nuclear weapons just happen to be cheap, and increasing our expensive conventional armies would wreak havoc on the budget deficit.

Another option would be complete American withdrawal from Europe. Why should we pay for the defense of Europe? Let the Europeans ward of the Soviets by themselves; they are no longer the war-weary peoples of the 1940s and '50s.

While ultimately the most attractive course to take, reducing our troop levels in Europe is not a quick fix. Withdrawals would have to occur gradually, in conjunction with careful negotiations with our allies, so they can replace our forces with their own.

Unfortunately, at present the Europeans have little desire to devote large budgetary resources to their defense. Until we can persuade them to do so, we must continue to guard the continent. If our commitment disappeared, our closest allies--culturally and economically as well as militarily--would be at substantial risk. A world without intimate friends in Europe would be a cold one indeed, something to consider next time the Administration's negotiators sit down in snowy Geneva.