The Russian High Wire Game

Russian President Boris Yeltsin continues to walk a political tightrope, and if we're smart, we'll be right behind him, offering him both a steadying hand and firm guidance.

Since the fall of Communism, Russia has bounced like a yo-yo between equally unsavory dangers: civil war and dictatorship.

Several weeks ago, with the Russian parliament in rebellion and the military waffling, the chief threat was civil war. After an almost disastrous delay, Yeltsin eventually did the right thing and confronted the renegade parliament. After some undemocratic tank diplomacy, the key opposition leaders were jailed and Yeltsin began a general crackdown that included press censorship and the stifling of local governments.

Now, with Yeltsin back in command, critics are warning that authoritarianism is looming dangerously on the horizon--some have even begun calling Yeltsin, "Czar Boris I."

The impetus for the latest round of name-calling is the recently released draft of Russia's new constitution. The document was put together by Yeltsin and his staff, and it shows.

The proposed constitution significantly enhances Yeltsin's power. He has the right to name the prime minister, to dissolve parliament, and to appoint the head of the Central Bank, a crucial position in Russia's fledgling market economy. The constitution also makes it difficult to impeach the president, requiring a two-thirds majority of parliament and the consent of the constitutional court, the judicial arm of the Russian government. And by casting doubt on his earlier promise to hold presidential elections in 1994, Yeltsin may have also secured his position until 1996.

On the more progressive side, the proposed constitution does guarantee Russians citizens the right to private property, free speech and freedom of religion. The constitution also out-laws any state-imposed ideology.

The constitution will come before the Russian people (assuming no major crises intervene) on December 12, the same day that a new parliament is up for election. In the past Yeltsin has received solid support from the Russian people. If that trend continues, Russia will have a new constitution and a new, reasonably pro-Yeltsin parliament. In one day, Russia could potentially kill the Soviet-era constitution and a parliament largely consisting of Communist-era holdovers.

With these essential steps taken, the real test will begin. The next several years will determine whether Yeltsin furthers and solidifies the transition to demcracy or retreats to but convenient shortsighted absolutism.

The proposed Russian constitution will play a significant role in this choice, but it will not be crucial. Constitutions do not make or break nations--leaders do. Even the universally-lauded United States constitution would have been in trouble had George Washington decided to aggressively assert presidential power; instead he set a stable course by showing restraint. The French Fifth Republic further demonstrates the malleability of constitutions; every French president since Charles De Gaulle has molded the constitution in a particular direction.

While certainly leaning in the direction of a strong presidency, the proposed constitution is far from unworkable. The essential ingredient will be moderation in the interpretation of the document.

Unfortunately, Yeltsin seems to have trouble with the concept of moderation; he has a disturbing habit of taking quick unilateral decisions without consultation. This is a useful trait at times, but thoroughly dangerous as a general modus operandi.

Domestic opposition to Yeltsin may temper these excesses, but the world--the U.S. in particular--has a role to play.

It would be nice if none of the burden for Russian success or failure were on the shoulders of the U.S. But the U.S. is inextricably involved in Russia's future. Russia is relying on the U.S. to help provide regional stability and to keep the Russian economy afloat.

The proper role for the U.S. in this next crucial period will be to nudge Yeltsin along the path of restraint, using its massive leverage quietly but firmly. This is a subdued type of diplomacy that will only become public if something goes wrong.

President Clinton's administration has had some very public failures in foreign policy. Yet they count Russia as a success. They have been on Yeltsin's side, and Yeltsin has prevailed. The task now is to ensure that more than Yeltsin survives, that some type of democracy survives with him.

The stakes are high. Russia is the key to the stability of the entire former Soviet Union, a region already beset by numerous ethnic conflicts. Russia is also the owner of thousands of nuclear warheads, weapons that could easily slip into the wrong hands under an unstable or desperate government.

Public attention, as naturally happens, has waned since the tanks left the parliament building. But there should be no doubt that the crucial task of forming a democracy is taking place everyday.