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creases respect for us abroad, which-(1) Benefits American citizens abroad.-(2) Benefits those engaged in foreign trade.-(b) It increases our foreign trade.
III. This is the course favored by the American people.
IV. The present Administration has departed from this policy, as shown-(a) by our policy in regard to the Nicaragua canal: Forum, XVI. 690; Public Opinion, XVI. 520.-(b) By our action in the Armenian affair.-(c) By our attitude in the Venezuelan crisis: No. Amer. Rev. Vol. 161, pp. 628 et seq.-(d) By our action in regard to Hawaii: Snow, American Diplomacy, 361; Hoar, in Cong. Record, 1893-94, p. 430 (Dec. 20, '93).
Brief for the Negative.J. T. COOPER and L. T. HILDRETH.
Best general references: Judge Cooley, Grave Obstacles to Hawaiian Annexation, Forum, XV, 389 to 406 (Je. 1893); A. B. Hart, Practical Essays on American Government, p. 98; Cleveland's Writings and Speeches, p. 35; Cleveland's Message, Public Opinion, XVI, 238 and 261 (Dec. 7 and 14, 1893); Journal of Political Economy, I, 280 (Mch. 1893); The Hawaiian Failure, Nation, LVIII, 96 (Feb. 8, 1894); The True Monroe Doctrine, Nation, XXXIV, 9 (Jan. 5, 1882); Papers relating to annexation of Hawaii; House report on foreign relations for 1893.
I. It is Cleveland's policy to protect the interests of the United States in her relations with foreign countries.-(a) He protected the American fishermen in the Canadian fisheries controversy: Message to Congress, Speeches and Writings of Grover Cleveland, 501.-(b) He advocated the United States having a controlling interest in the Nicaragua Canal: Cleveland's Message in Public Opinion, XVI, 238.-(c) Since he disclaimed the annexation of Hawaii.-(1) He saved to the United States $5,000,000 a year bounty: Journal of Political Economy, I, 184.
II. More aggressive action in diplomacy is inexpedient.-(a) It increases the possibility of war.-(b) It attracts attention from the development of our internal resources to subjects with which we have no concern.-(c) Adjustment of European affairs should be left to the nations interested.-(1) The case of England and Armenia.
III. The acquisition of territory is dangerous to our internal prosperity.-(a) It introduces a dangerous class into our national life; Carl Schurz in Public Opinion, XVI, 16.-(1) Those unaccustomed to our form of government.-(2) Those who are not committed to our customs and social ideals.-(b) Makes the United States more vulnerable in case of war.-(1) Increases sea coast open to attack.-(2) Increases difficulty of massing troops on short notice.-(c) Tends to weaken the Union.-(1) People living at great distances from each other must have divided interests.
IV. Protectorates over semi-civilized peoples tend to complicate our foreign relations.-(a) Liability to foreign interference.-(1) Intervention can be excused only on grounds of self-preservation.-(x) For protection of institutions and good order.-(y) External safety of border states.-(z) Protection of our citizens abroad.-(b) Our treaty obligations.-Should protect foreigners.-(c) Legal obligations.-(1) Offences countenanced.-(d) Neutral obligations.
V. We could derive no profit from a more aggressive policy.-(a) It will not increase our trade.-(b) We do not need further acquisition of territory.-(c) It would involve more taxation by increasing the expenses of the navy.-(d) We ought not to extend Anglo Sax on civilization beyond our borders until we have perfected it among ourselves.
VI. A more aggressive policy is opposed to the Munroe Doctrine.-(a) It interferes in European affairs.-(b) It would bring about interference in our affairs.-(c) Tends toward acquisition of territory, and we have already extended our limits to their natural boundaries.