Parliamentarism in Japan: Can it Survive?

Tatsuo Arima '57 is a teaching in Government and a tutor in House, Akira Iriye, a graduate, is a teaching fellow History. Mr. Iriye and Mr. Arima, both natives of Japan, spent studying political .

May 15, 1932, the prime minister of Japan assassinated by a group of fanatic soldiers ultra-nationalists. His final plea, "Let us then you would understand," was silenced rude interruption, "No use to talk." time, the Japanese parliamentary steadily deteriorated into an ornamental which simply bestowed approval on the of the Imperial cabinets. Occasionally, , hesitant yet tenacious voices of dissent courageous few made themselves heard. them was Inejiro Asanuma, who was by an eighteen-year old fanatic last .

event once again brought to the surface a fact of Japanese political culture. The ambiguities of the Japanese language often led to a heavy reliance on raw symbols and intuitive expressions than on an attempt at clear articulation . This has given culture an excessicely quality but has exalted direct acts on intuition at the expense of coherent If parliamentarianism is meant to refer discussion of concrete issues in a patient to arrive at solutions, this characteristic be regarded as the unfortunate antithesis Parliamentarianism. This fact has made the of parliamentary democracy a painfully task in Japan. Herein lies, we believe, problem of Japanese politics today, and whenever we turn to the analysis of events. There has been much talk of , anti-Americanism, violence, and in Japan. All these should be looked the context of the survival of parliament-arism in that country.

Briefly speaking, the series of and riots during the months of May and began when the Kishi cabinet forced the of the Mutual Security Act on May 19, the attendance of the members of the , Socialist Party. Before then, the with the United States had been debated Diet committee, but the government had only given evasive and vague answers to the pertinent questions regarding what many people considered the most important treaty Japan was ever to sign after the war. On May 19, the Socialists were apprised of the intention of the government to have the treaty passed immediately by the Diet without allowing further discussion. According to the Constitution, the treaty, if passed by the Lower House on that day, would have been automatically ratified on June 19, regardless of the actions of the Upper House. And June 19 was the date President Eisenhower was expected to arrive in Japan. The Socialists were exasperated by what they considered to be a cunning move by the government to have the visit coincide with the automatic ratification of the treaty. In their protest and desperation, the Socialist Party resorted to force, and some of its members blocked the Speaker's room, in the hope of preventing him from coming on to the floor of the Lower House. The government called in the police, who carried out the Socialist sittersin one by one amid noisy protests and ugly insults.

After the unexpected passage of the treaty, the opposition to the government came to include not only those who had strongly opposed the treaty, but many of those who had favored it, and most of those who had remained indifferent. From this time on, quite abruptly, the anti-government program widened its base to embrace, besides opposition to the treaty, the questions of the "preservation of democracy," the "normalization of parliamentary politics," and, as a concomitant to the anti-Kishi slogans, the movement against Eisenhower's visit. In this sense, a purely partisan, leftist movement was converted into a city-centered mass movement against the allegedly anti-parliamentarian attitude of the Kishi cabinet. The main argument was that the government had refused to deliberate further on the treaty, but had resorted to a direct action, even daring to employ the police within the Diet building. The Socialists, too, had used force, but this was considered a lesser offense to parliamentarianism than the acts of the government. The demonstrators demanded the resignation of the prime minister and the dissolution of the Diet, so that public opinion could be heard anew on the treaty. In doing so, they had the almost unanimous support of the major newspapers. It was a selfconscious movement to restore faith in parliamentarianism. The government strongly defended its stand, and claimed that it, too, was holding parliamentarianism against attempts to overthrow it violently.

It was encouraging that both the government and the anti-government forces supported their respective positions in terms of the defense of Japanese parliamentary democracy. There were, however, discouraging symptoms in both camps which complicated the issue and yet which went to the heart of the problem.

Let us first take the Socialists. They had not enjoyed the confidence of the people. During the riots of May and June, there were few placards proposing the establishment of a Socialist government. Their abstract arguments and self-righteous criticisms of the government had had little appeal to the average voter. Further-more, they had failed to address themselves to the solution of concrete problems, while deeply immersed within theoretical controversies among themselves. The atrophy of confidence in the opposition party, as well as in the governmental party, might suggest an eventual demise of parliamentarianism itself, reminding one of the situation in the thirties and forties. That this is not an idle speculation can be seen in the attitude of some of the Japanese bureaucrats. In a country where the parliamentary system emerged not as an indigenous political force but as a transplanted mechanism, there is a repeated assertion on the part of those critical of the system that parliamentarianism only defines the rules of political decision making, and as such has no intrinsic normative value. Once one of us was invited to attend a discussion meeting of a few young bureaucrats from a certain ministry. There he had the frightfully uncomfortble experience of listening to them expound the notion of the inherent inefficiency of the parliamentary system. They exhibited a peculiar combination of Marxist-Leninist contempt for parliamentarianism as a bourgeois facade with the impatient frustration of bureaucrats at the irritating inefficiency of the parliamentary procedure.

This elitist outlook toward politics was also shared by the intellectuals, particularly college professors. They exhibited their sceptical attitude toward members of the Diet and insisted that the majority in the Diet did not represent the "will of the people," revealing their contempt for the competence of the voters to choose. Nevertheless, unless the intellectuals are very careful in approaching the subject of "enlightening the voting public," they will further alienate themselves from the common strata of Japanese society. After the hypertheoretical per- spective of the intellectual results in a lack of realism in answering more concrete questions of daily life. For example, one of the most persistently repeated words during the demonstrations was "Doutralism." Enchanting though the expression was, we felt discouraged each time we asked more prominent intellectuals to articulate this idea within the realistic context of international politics. They failed to define specific means through which this goal would be reached, or to point out concrete alternatives to the present alliance with the United States.

The most disturbing feature of the whole episode was the attitude of some of the more radical students. Throughout the month and a half between May and June, the Japanese students, we were told, revealed an impressive ability in planning their strategy and in organizing themselves and discussion groups in the best democratic tradition. Such an ability, however, was confined only to those who shared the same views. Once they were placed in a situation where they had to express their opinion to other groups of people, they ordinarily evinced an attitude of arrogant contempt and self-righteousness, refusing to create a channel of communication. Their sense of "crisis" as well as their emotional commitment to "orthodox Marxism" compelled them to negate altogether the possibility of parliamentary gradualism.

Seen in such a framework as we have tried to describe, the gigantic political movements of May and June were one more instance of the Japanese people's effort to gain political expression. Those for and against the government both exhibited eagerness to defend "parliamentarianism," but their attitudes were often its very opposite. At that time we hoped that the people had sufficiently grappled with the problem of implementing parliamentary democracy in a society which had lacked a tradition of the logical articulation of ideas. We hoped that amid the confusion and chaos of the period, the principles of parliamentarianism would sink deeply into the consciousness of the Japanese people.

The assassination last week indicated that the threat to parliamentarianism has never been eradicated. It was third in a series of attempts made on eminent political figures since last June. The first assassin, attacking the life of a moderate Socialist leader, had no relations with a rightist group, and except for his hatred of the Zengakuren, he committed his act in a schizophrenic fit. The second attacker, aiming at Kishi, had no intention of killing him, but wanted merely to punish the prime minister for having "clumsily handled the problems of the Liberal Democratic Party." The third incident differed from the previous two in that the youth had undertaken the act out of a genuine political conviction. Obviously, the governmental party had nothing to do with this tragic event. Nor does it seem that the assassin represents a significant portion of the population, or act is suggestive of the strength of in Japan today. Nevertheless assassination is significant as an indicator of what could happen in a lacking a parliamentarian tradition the sense that we described above thermore, there is the possibility the assassination may lead to the of extremism both within leftist and the rightist groups, would resort to violence to combat other, rather than submitting themselves to a patient process of parliamentarianism.

Both the Liberal Democratic and Socialist Parties must now stand together against their common foes reported demand by the Socialists the premier resign impresses us realistic and utterly dangerous. question is not one of right It is a matter of confidence in the process of government versus with the parliamentary procedure this sense, Asanuma should not be a martyr of the Socialist cause. he is a martyr of the constitutional of democracy in Japan. Before comfortable silence might again vail under the tyranny of the left right, those who have once learn a lesson of such a tyranny should forth and dedicate themselves arduous task of maintaining a Parliamentary democracy in Japan

event once again brought to the surface a fact of Japanese political culture. The ambiguities of the Japanese language often led to a heavy reliance on raw symbols and intuitive expressions than on an attempt at clear articulation . This has given culture an excessicely quality but has exalted direct acts on intuition at the expense of coherent If parliamentarianism is meant to refer discussion of concrete issues in a patient to arrive at solutions, this characteristic be regarded as the unfortunate antithesis Parliamentarianism. This fact has made the of parliamentary democracy a painfully task in Japan. Herein lies, we believe, problem of Japanese politics today, and whenever we turn to the analysis of events. There has been much talk of , anti-Americanism, violence, and in Japan. All these should be looked the context of the survival of parliament-arism in that country.

Briefly speaking, the series of and riots during the months of May and began when the Kishi cabinet forced the of the Mutual Security Act on May 19, the attendance of the members of the , Socialist Party. Before then, the with the United States had been debated Diet committee, but the government had only given evasive and vague answers to the pertinent questions regarding what many people considered the most important treaty Japan was ever to sign after the war. On May 19, the Socialists were apprised of the intention of the government to have the treaty passed immediately by the Diet without allowing further discussion. According to the Constitution, the treaty, if passed by the Lower House on that day, would have been automatically ratified on June 19, regardless of the actions of the Upper House. And June 19 was the date President Eisenhower was expected to arrive in Japan. The Socialists were exasperated by what they considered to be a cunning move by the government to have the visit coincide with the automatic ratification of the treaty. In their protest and desperation, the Socialist Party resorted to force, and some of its members blocked the Speaker's room, in the hope of preventing him from coming on to the floor of the Lower House. The government called in the police, who carried out the Socialist sittersin one by one amid noisy protests and ugly insults.

After the unexpected passage of the treaty, the opposition to the government came to include not only those who had strongly opposed the treaty, but many of those who had favored it, and most of those who had remained indifferent. From this time on, quite abruptly, the anti-government program widened its base to embrace, besides opposition to the treaty, the questions of the "preservation of democracy," the "normalization of parliamentary politics," and, as a concomitant to the anti-Kishi slogans, the movement against Eisenhower's visit. In this sense, a purely partisan, leftist movement was converted into a city-centered mass movement against the allegedly anti-parliamentarian attitude of the Kishi cabinet. The main argument was that the government had refused to deliberate further on the treaty, but had resorted to a direct action, even daring to employ the police within the Diet building. The Socialists, too, had used force, but this was considered a lesser offense to parliamentarianism than the acts of the government. The demonstrators demanded the resignation of the prime minister and the dissolution of the Diet, so that public opinion could be heard anew on the treaty. In doing so, they had the almost unanimous support of the major newspapers. It was a selfconscious movement to restore faith in parliamentarianism. The government strongly defended its stand, and claimed that it, too, was holding parliamentarianism against attempts to overthrow it violently.

It was encouraging that both the government and the anti-government forces supported their respective positions in terms of the defense of Japanese parliamentary democracy. There were, however, discouraging symptoms in both camps which complicated the issue and yet which went to the heart of the problem.

Let us first take the Socialists. They had not enjoyed the confidence of the people. During the riots of May and June, there were few placards proposing the establishment of a Socialist government. Their abstract arguments and self-righteous criticisms of the government had had little appeal to the average voter. Further-more, they had failed to address themselves to the solution of concrete problems, while deeply immersed within theoretical controversies among themselves. The atrophy of confidence in the opposition party, as well as in the governmental party, might suggest an eventual demise of parliamentarianism itself, reminding one of the situation in the thirties and forties. That this is not an idle speculation can be seen in the attitude of some of the Japanese bureaucrats. In a country where the parliamentary system emerged not as an indigenous political force but as a transplanted mechanism, there is a repeated assertion on the part of those critical of the system that parliamentarianism only defines the rules of political decision making, and as such has no intrinsic normative value. Once one of us was invited to attend a discussion meeting of a few young bureaucrats from a certain ministry. There he had the frightfully uncomfortble experience of listening to them expound the notion of the inherent inefficiency of the parliamentary system. They exhibited a peculiar combination of Marxist-Leninist contempt for parliamentarianism as a bourgeois facade with the impatient frustration of bureaucrats at the irritating inefficiency of the parliamentary procedure.

This elitist outlook toward politics was also shared by the intellectuals, particularly college professors. They exhibited their sceptical attitude toward members of the Diet and insisted that the majority in the Diet did not represent the "will of the people," revealing their contempt for the competence of the voters to choose. Nevertheless, unless the intellectuals are very careful in approaching the subject of "enlightening the voting public," they will further alienate themselves from the common strata of Japanese society. After the hypertheoretical per- spective of the intellectual results in a lack of realism in answering more concrete questions of daily life. For example, one of the most persistently repeated words during the demonstrations was "Doutralism." Enchanting though the expression was, we felt discouraged each time we asked more prominent intellectuals to articulate this idea within the realistic context of international politics. They failed to define specific means through which this goal would be reached, or to point out concrete alternatives to the present alliance with the United States.

The most disturbing feature of the whole episode was the attitude of some of the more radical students. Throughout the month and a half between May and June, the Japanese students, we were told, revealed an impressive ability in planning their strategy and in organizing themselves and discussion groups in the best democratic tradition. Such an ability, however, was confined only to those who shared the same views. Once they were placed in a situation where they had to express their opinion to other groups of people, they ordinarily evinced an attitude of arrogant contempt and self-righteousness, refusing to create a channel of communication. Their sense of "crisis" as well as their emotional commitment to "orthodox Marxism" compelled them to negate altogether the possibility of parliamentary gradualism.

Seen in such a framework as we have tried to describe, the gigantic political movements of May and June were one more instance of the Japanese people's effort to gain political expression. Those for and against the government both exhibited eagerness to defend "parliamentarianism," but their attitudes were often its very opposite. At that time we hoped that the people had sufficiently grappled with the problem of implementing parliamentary democracy in a society which had lacked a tradition of the logical articulation of ideas. We hoped that amid the confusion and chaos of the period, the principles of parliamentarianism would sink deeply into the consciousness of the Japanese people.

The assassination last week indicated that the threat to parliamentarianism has never been eradicated. It was third in a series of attempts made on eminent political figures since last June. The first assassin, attacking the life of a moderate Socialist leader, had no relations with a rightist group, and except for his hatred of the Zengakuren, he committed his act in a schizophrenic fit. The second attacker, aiming at Kishi, had no intention of killing him, but wanted merely to punish the prime minister for having "clumsily handled the problems of the Liberal Democratic Party." The third incident differed from the previous two in that the youth had undertaken the act out of a genuine political conviction. Obviously, the governmental party had nothing to do with this tragic event. Nor does it seem that the assassin represents a significant portion of the population, or act is suggestive of the strength of in Japan today. Nevertheless assassination is significant as an indicator of what could happen in a lacking a parliamentarian tradition the sense that we described above thermore, there is the possibility the assassination may lead to the of extremism both within leftist and the rightist groups, would resort to violence to combat other, rather than submitting themselves to a patient process of parliamentarianism.

Both the Liberal Democratic and Socialist Parties must now stand together against their common foes reported demand by the Socialists the premier resign impresses us realistic and utterly dangerous. question is not one of right It is a matter of confidence in the process of government versus with the parliamentary procedure this sense, Asanuma should not be a martyr of the Socialist cause. he is a martyr of the constitutional of democracy in Japan. Before comfortable silence might again vail under the tyranny of the left right, those who have once learn a lesson of such a tyranny should forth and dedicate themselves arduous task of maintaining a Parliamentary democracy in Japan

Briefly speaking, the series of and riots during the months of May and began when the Kishi cabinet forced the of the Mutual Security Act on May 19, the attendance of the members of the , Socialist Party. Before then, the with the United States had been debated Diet committee, but the government had only given evasive and vague answers to the pertinent questions regarding what many people considered the most important treaty Japan was ever to sign after the war. On May 19, the Socialists were apprised of the intention of the government to have the treaty passed immediately by the Diet without allowing further discussion. According to the Constitution, the treaty, if passed by the Lower House on that day, would have been automatically ratified on June 19, regardless of the actions of the Upper House. And June 19 was the date President Eisenhower was expected to arrive in Japan. The Socialists were exasperated by what they considered to be a cunning move by the government to have the visit coincide with the automatic ratification of the treaty. In their protest and desperation, the Socialist Party resorted to force, and some of its members blocked the Speaker's room, in the hope of preventing him from coming on to the floor of the Lower House. The government called in the police, who carried out the Socialist sittersin one by one amid noisy protests and ugly insults.

After the unexpected passage of the treaty, the opposition to the government came to include not only those who had strongly opposed the treaty, but many of those who had favored it, and most of those who had remained indifferent. From this time on, quite abruptly, the anti-government program widened its base to embrace, besides opposition to the treaty, the questions of the "preservation of democracy," the "normalization of parliamentary politics," and, as a concomitant to the anti-Kishi slogans, the movement against Eisenhower's visit. In this sense, a purely partisan, leftist movement was converted into a city-centered mass movement against the allegedly anti-parliamentarian attitude of the Kishi cabinet. The main argument was that the government had refused to deliberate further on the treaty, but had resorted to a direct action, even daring to employ the police within the Diet building. The Socialists, too, had used force, but this was considered a lesser offense to parliamentarianism than the acts of the government. The demonstrators demanded the resignation of the prime minister and the dissolution of the Diet, so that public opinion could be heard anew on the treaty. In doing so, they had the almost unanimous support of the major newspapers. It was a selfconscious movement to restore faith in parliamentarianism. The government strongly defended its stand, and claimed that it, too, was holding parliamentarianism against attempts to overthrow it violently.

It was encouraging that both the government and the anti-government forces supported their respective positions in terms of the defense of Japanese parliamentary democracy. There were, however, discouraging symptoms in both camps which complicated the issue and yet which went to the heart of the problem.

Let us first take the Socialists. They had not enjoyed the confidence of the people. During the riots of May and June, there were few placards proposing the establishment of a Socialist government. Their abstract arguments and self-righteous criticisms of the government had had little appeal to the average voter. Further-more, they had failed to address themselves to the solution of concrete problems, while deeply immersed within theoretical controversies among themselves. The atrophy of confidence in the opposition party, as well as in the governmental party, might suggest an eventual demise of parliamentarianism itself, reminding one of the situation in the thirties and forties. That this is not an idle speculation can be seen in the attitude of some of the Japanese bureaucrats. In a country where the parliamentary system emerged not as an indigenous political force but as a transplanted mechanism, there is a repeated assertion on the part of those critical of the system that parliamentarianism only defines the rules of political decision making, and as such has no intrinsic normative value. Once one of us was invited to attend a discussion meeting of a few young bureaucrats from a certain ministry. There he had the frightfully uncomfortble experience of listening to them expound the notion of the inherent inefficiency of the parliamentary system. They exhibited a peculiar combination of Marxist-Leninist contempt for parliamentarianism as a bourgeois facade with the impatient frustration of bureaucrats at the irritating inefficiency of the parliamentary procedure.

This elitist outlook toward politics was also shared by the intellectuals, particularly college professors. They exhibited their sceptical attitude toward members of the Diet and insisted that the majority in the Diet did not represent the "will of the people," revealing their contempt for the competence of the voters to choose. Nevertheless, unless the intellectuals are very careful in approaching the subject of "enlightening the voting public," they will further alienate themselves from the common strata of Japanese society. After the hypertheoretical per- spective of the intellectual results in a lack of realism in answering more concrete questions of daily life. For example, one of the most persistently repeated words during the demonstrations was "Doutralism." Enchanting though the expression was, we felt discouraged each time we asked more prominent intellectuals to articulate this idea within the realistic context of international politics. They failed to define specific means through which this goal would be reached, or to point out concrete alternatives to the present alliance with the United States.

The most disturbing feature of the whole episode was the attitude of some of the more radical students. Throughout the month and a half between May and June, the Japanese students, we were told, revealed an impressive ability in planning their strategy and in organizing themselves and discussion groups in the best democratic tradition. Such an ability, however, was confined only to those who shared the same views. Once they were placed in a situation where they had to express their opinion to other groups of people, they ordinarily evinced an attitude of arrogant contempt and self-righteousness, refusing to create a channel of communication. Their sense of "crisis" as well as their emotional commitment to "orthodox Marxism" compelled them to negate altogether the possibility of parliamentary gradualism.

Seen in such a framework as we have tried to describe, the gigantic political movements of May and June were one more instance of the Japanese people's effort to gain political expression. Those for and against the government both exhibited eagerness to defend "parliamentarianism," but their attitudes were often its very opposite. At that time we hoped that the people had sufficiently grappled with the problem of implementing parliamentary democracy in a society which had lacked a tradition of the logical articulation of ideas. We hoped that amid the confusion and chaos of the period, the principles of parliamentarianism would sink deeply into the consciousness of the Japanese people.

The assassination last week indicated that the threat to parliamentarianism has never been eradicated. It was third in a series of attempts made on eminent political figures since last June. The first assassin, attacking the life of a moderate Socialist leader, had no relations with a rightist group, and except for his hatred of the Zengakuren, he committed his act in a schizophrenic fit. The second attacker, aiming at Kishi, had no intention of killing him, but wanted merely to punish the prime minister for having "clumsily handled the problems of the Liberal Democratic Party." The third incident differed from the previous two in that the youth had undertaken the act out of a genuine political conviction. Obviously, the governmental party had nothing to do with this tragic event. Nor does it seem that the assassin represents a significant portion of the population, or act is suggestive of the strength of in Japan today. Nevertheless assassination is significant as an indicator of what could happen in a lacking a parliamentarian tradition the sense that we described above thermore, there is the possibility the assassination may lead to the of extremism both within leftist and the rightist groups, would resort to violence to combat other, rather than submitting themselves to a patient process of parliamentarianism.

Both the Liberal Democratic and Socialist Parties must now stand together against their common foes reported demand by the Socialists the premier resign impresses us realistic and utterly dangerous. question is not one of right It is a matter of confidence in the process of government versus with the parliamentary procedure this sense, Asanuma should not be a martyr of the Socialist cause. he is a martyr of the constitutional of democracy in Japan. Before comfortable silence might again vail under the tyranny of the left right, those who have once learn a lesson of such a tyranny should forth and dedicate themselves arduous task of maintaining a Parliamentary democracy in Japan

After the unexpected passage of the treaty, the opposition to the government came to include not only those who had strongly opposed the treaty, but many of those who had favored it, and most of those who had remained indifferent. From this time on, quite abruptly, the anti-government program widened its base to embrace, besides opposition to the treaty, the questions of the "preservation of democracy," the "normalization of parliamentary politics," and, as a concomitant to the anti-Kishi slogans, the movement against Eisenhower's visit. In this sense, a purely partisan, leftist movement was converted into a city-centered mass movement against the allegedly anti-parliamentarian attitude of the Kishi cabinet. The main argument was that the government had refused to deliberate further on the treaty, but had resorted to a direct action, even daring to employ the police within the Diet building. The Socialists, too, had used force, but this was considered a lesser offense to parliamentarianism than the acts of the government. The demonstrators demanded the resignation of the prime minister and the dissolution of the Diet, so that public opinion could be heard anew on the treaty. In doing so, they had the almost unanimous support of the major newspapers. It was a selfconscious movement to restore faith in parliamentarianism. The government strongly defended its stand, and claimed that it, too, was holding parliamentarianism against attempts to overthrow it violently.

It was encouraging that both the government and the anti-government forces supported their respective positions in terms of the defense of Japanese parliamentary democracy. There were, however, discouraging symptoms in both camps which complicated the issue and yet which went to the heart of the problem.

Let us first take the Socialists. They had not enjoyed the confidence of the people. During the riots of May and June, there were few placards proposing the establishment of a Socialist government. Their abstract arguments and self-righteous criticisms of the government had had little appeal to the average voter. Further-more, they had failed to address themselves to the solution of concrete problems, while deeply immersed within theoretical controversies among themselves. The atrophy of confidence in the opposition party, as well as in the governmental party, might suggest an eventual demise of parliamentarianism itself, reminding one of the situation in the thirties and forties. That this is not an idle speculation can be seen in the attitude of some of the Japanese bureaucrats. In a country where the parliamentary system emerged not as an indigenous political force but as a transplanted mechanism, there is a repeated assertion on the part of those critical of the system that parliamentarianism only defines the rules of political decision making, and as such has no intrinsic normative value. Once one of us was invited to attend a discussion meeting of a few young bureaucrats from a certain ministry. There he had the frightfully uncomfortble experience of listening to them expound the notion of the inherent inefficiency of the parliamentary system. They exhibited a peculiar combination of Marxist-Leninist contempt for parliamentarianism as a bourgeois facade with the impatient frustration of bureaucrats at the irritating inefficiency of the parliamentary procedure.

This elitist outlook toward politics was also shared by the intellectuals, particularly college professors. They exhibited their sceptical attitude toward members of the Diet and insisted that the majority in the Diet did not represent the "will of the people," revealing their contempt for the competence of the voters to choose. Nevertheless, unless the intellectuals are very careful in approaching the subject of "enlightening the voting public," they will further alienate themselves from the common strata of Japanese society. After the hypertheoretical per- spective of the intellectual results in a lack of realism in answering more concrete questions of daily life. For example, one of the most persistently repeated words during the demonstrations was "Doutralism." Enchanting though the expression was, we felt discouraged each time we asked more prominent intellectuals to articulate this idea within the realistic context of international politics. They failed to define specific means through which this goal would be reached, or to point out concrete alternatives to the present alliance with the United States.

The most disturbing feature of the whole episode was the attitude of some of the more radical students. Throughout the month and a half between May and June, the Japanese students, we were told, revealed an impressive ability in planning their strategy and in organizing themselves and discussion groups in the best democratic tradition. Such an ability, however, was confined only to those who shared the same views. Once they were placed in a situation where they had to express their opinion to other groups of people, they ordinarily evinced an attitude of arrogant contempt and self-righteousness, refusing to create a channel of communication. Their sense of "crisis" as well as their emotional commitment to "orthodox Marxism" compelled them to negate altogether the possibility of parliamentary gradualism.

Seen in such a framework as we have tried to describe, the gigantic political movements of May and June were one more instance of the Japanese people's effort to gain political expression. Those for and against the government both exhibited eagerness to defend "parliamentarianism," but their attitudes were often its very opposite. At that time we hoped that the people had sufficiently grappled with the problem of implementing parliamentary democracy in a society which had lacked a tradition of the logical articulation of ideas. We hoped that amid the confusion and chaos of the period, the principles of parliamentarianism would sink deeply into the consciousness of the Japanese people.

The assassination last week indicated that the threat to parliamentarianism has never been eradicated. It was third in a series of attempts made on eminent political figures since last June. The first assassin, attacking the life of a moderate Socialist leader, had no relations with a rightist group, and except for his hatred of the Zengakuren, he committed his act in a schizophrenic fit. The second attacker, aiming at Kishi, had no intention of killing him, but wanted merely to punish the prime minister for having "clumsily handled the problems of the Liberal Democratic Party." The third incident differed from the previous two in that the youth had undertaken the act out of a genuine political conviction. Obviously, the governmental party had nothing to do with this tragic event. Nor does it seem that the assassin represents a significant portion of the population, or act is suggestive of the strength of in Japan today. Nevertheless assassination is significant as an indicator of what could happen in a lacking a parliamentarian tradition the sense that we described above thermore, there is the possibility the assassination may lead to the of extremism both within leftist and the rightist groups, would resort to violence to combat other, rather than submitting themselves to a patient process of parliamentarianism.

Both the Liberal Democratic and Socialist Parties must now stand together against their common foes reported demand by the Socialists the premier resign impresses us realistic and utterly dangerous. question is not one of right It is a matter of confidence in the process of government versus with the parliamentary procedure this sense, Asanuma should not be a martyr of the Socialist cause. he is a martyr of the constitutional of democracy in Japan. Before comfortable silence might again vail under the tyranny of the left right, those who have once learn a lesson of such a tyranny should forth and dedicate themselves arduous task of maintaining a Parliamentary democracy in Japan

Both the Liberal Democratic and Socialist Parties must now stand together against their common foes reported demand by the Socialists the premier resign impresses us realistic and utterly dangerous. question is not one of right It is a matter of confidence in the process of government versus with the parliamentary procedure this sense, Asanuma should not be a martyr of the Socialist cause. he is a martyr of the constitutional of democracy in Japan. Before comfortable silence might again vail under the tyranny of the left right, those who have once learn a lesson of such a tyranny should forth and dedicate themselves arduous task of maintaining a Parliamentary democracy in Japan