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Do the MATEP

BRASS TACKS

By Robert O. Boorstin

L. EDWARD LASHMAN, the University's director of external projects, calls it "the most complicated thing I've ever done in my life"--and that from a man who spent many years organizing labor unions and admits to doing time "in some of the country's least hospitable jails."

Lashman has been saddled with the Medical Area Total Energy Plant--known to those who care as MATEP. Once upon a time, Harvard had a brilliant idea: build the largest co-generation plant in America to provide power for Harvard's medical schools and 13 other area institutions. Back then, they figured it would cost about $40 million. And they counted on large savings in oil that MATEP would pass on to its Harvard affiliates.

But nobody counted on community opposition, or the State Department of Environmental Quality Engineering (DEQE). Together with MATEP--which community representatives invariably refer to as "Harvard"--the trio locked horns in 1977. The community claimed MATEP's proposed diesel engines would spew large amounts of potentially harmful nitrogen dioxide into their backyards.

The DEQE, charged with looking after what's in Massachusetts air, held a very long, very technical and suffocatingly boring set of hearings. After days of testimony, a DEQE hearing officer had heard enough. She ruled against MATEP. Costs for the power plant skyrocketed, and Harvard officials began to sweat.

That was in January 1978. By June 1979, MATEP decided to take another tack. Since the first ruling was unfavorable, it decided to submit a proposal of its own, asking the DEQE to let the diesels be installed, but the DEQE said no.

But two weeks ago, another DEQE official said yes, but with certain strings attached. Willard R. Pope '63, counsel to the agency, said MATEP could have its diesels, if it promised not to emit more than 200 micrograms of nitrogen dioxide per cubic meter, to shut off the diesels if it exceeded the limit and--crucially--to pay for a backup utility in case the diesels had to be shut off.

THE PROPOSALS MADE almost nobody happy. MATEP is unhappy because it thinks the 200 limit is absurd. While Lashman says the plant can meet the "stringent conditions," as he labels them, it can only do so by sacrificing cost and energy efficiency. Harvard has already invested almost $175 million in what is beginning to look like a white elephant.

Originally, MATEP estimated it could save almost $2 million in its first year of operation; now Lashman says the new plant may barely keep up with current energy costs. But MATEP is in no position to be choosy: after Harvard's huge investment, it has to put its diesels in now, and argue about the details later.

Community groups are unhappy. They don't want any nitrogen dioxide--even amounts federal authorities have determined to be safe--floating into their backyards. The groups argue that after a DEQE hearing officer issued a decision, other officials shouldn't have chimed in. Michael Lambert, co-counsel for the Mission Hill residents, reflects the bottom line feelings; "Once Harvard gets the diesels in," he says, "they'll never take them down or shut them off." The community has visions of teeming hordes of Harvard-trained-and-hired lawyers streaming into courthouses, keeping the diesels running no matter how much nitrogen dioxide they pour out. Lashman's promise that the DEQE "has the right to jerk the permit and the absolute right to shut us down" falls on deaf ears.

Some people, however, are pleased. The DEQE official who must make the final decision has used the conflicting recommendations of his colleagues as an excuse for further delaying his decision. Boston Edison, the company that supplies power to the medical area, is still taking in about $3 million a year. Edison, which has no desire to lose such business to MATEP, also holds the final trump. It's the only company that can provide backup for Harvard, but to do so, it must invest $10 or $15 million in an essential step-down station. Edison spokesmen smugly tell you that if MATEP wants to buy backup power for 20,000 of the plant's 30,000 kilowatts, it will cost about $1 million a year. "If that's the case," says one, "you might as well forget the whole thing."

But Harvard and MATEP can literally not afford to let the project die. And until the diesels go in, no one will really know just how hazardous MATEP will be. The community says Harvard should have done its planning earlier; Harvard says the evidence is on its side. The DEQE commissioner, meanwhile, is damned if he says yes and damned if he says no. Either way, it looks like one group will take the other to court--and the MATEP saga will drone endlessly on.

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