South Korea, Caught in the Cold War Again

The Asian heavens have revealed many omens to South Korea this year: last winter a North Korean pilot defected to Seoul in his MIG 19; last May a Chinese airliner was hijacked on a domestic flight and forced to land in South Korea: over the summer a Chinese pilot flew his MIG to Seoul, touching off sirens and momentary panic, but the pilot was soon on his way to Taiwan: and in September the Soviet Union shot down a Korean jumbo passenger jet that strayed across Soviet territory on the last leg of its long journey from New York. The Korean government handled the first three incidents judiciously, including the success in achieving direct negotiations with the Chinese who still do not recognize them.

In contrast, the destruction of KAL 007 has become an international incident of near crisis proportions--complete with a Soviet veto in the UN Security Council, and significant repercussions in East-West relations, ranging from Congressional debates on defense issues to the refusal of Boston longshoremen to unload cargo from Soviet vessels--and came as a major shock to the Korean nation. The Korean government, the principal aggrieved party, has had its hands virtually tied.

Frustration and injured pride mark Korea's reaction. Annexed as a colony by Japan in 1910 and abjectly poor and totally dependent upon the US for its survival after the devastating Korean War. Korea has recently emerged on the world stage as a new industrial power and formidable economic competitor. Delegations from third world countries and southern states such as Alabama beat paths to Korea's door seeking investments. Justifiably proud of along history and sophisticated cultural achievements, in recent years Koreans have regained an acute faculty of national and racial pride and basked in this belated recognition. Koreans are counting on events such as this month's Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) Conference and the upcoming Seoul Olympics in 1988 to mark their full acceptance in the fellowship of advanced nations. KAL 007 was a slap in the face that underscored Korea's weakness in the international arena and its continued dependence on the US and to a lesser extent, Japan. Although it now seems questionable that the Soviets knew that it was a Korean Airline jet before shooting it down if is difficult for Koreans to believe that the Russians would have attacked a passenger jet from a more powerful nation such as the United States. Although South Korea has observer status at the UN (as does North Korea) and could present its case and state its outrage (done very ably by Ambassador Kvong Won Kim a Harvard Ph D) to the Security Council it is not a member of the UN and could not cast a vote or lead the darling and negotiation of a UN action. Because it does not have diplomatic relations with the USSR despite continued efforts. Korea had to rely upon Washington to transmit its demands to the Soviets and upon Japan to make arrangements for the return of debris and remains recovered by the Russians. Korea has no complaints about the manner in which the US and Japan have represented its interests; indeed, it is gratified by the reaffirmation of its close, cooperative relationships with its key partners in economic and security affairs. Yet there is no substitute for representing one's position directly, and there is little security in having a superpower neighbor, whether overtly hostile or not, with whom one cannot even talk.

Psychologically, the incident has struck peculiarly Korean sensitivities. Despite Korea's sorry record on human rights, the killing of human beings by government authorities without at least a show of due process has never been acceptable to Koreans, violations of this sensibility caused the downfall of the Rhee government in 1960 and underlie the popular distaste for the Chun regime today. In Korea even more than in the US, it is the Soviet leaders in Moscow who are seen as criminally responsible for the deaths of the passengers of KAL007.

There are domestic political effects as well. Because Koreans view the Russian attack as an attack on Korea, they have rallied strongly to their nation and to their President Chun Do Hwam. Strong antipathies to communism have been reinforced, and the government has announced that material on the Soviet action will be added to anti-Communist instructional materials--materials intended to teach how Koreans themselves have suffered because of communism. This rallying to the nation has pushed other political domestic questions aside, to the short-term benefit of the Chun government.

A growing political problem has been the continued unpopularity of President Chun and his regime. The government is in complete control and is not challenged by any organized opposition, but its popularity is limited and its efforts to establish legitimacy have fallen short. The student demonstrations that shook the campuses last spring were the largest in three years--since Chun's takeover. Student demonstrations in South Korea are no longer the powerful force and leading indicator of public unrest they once were. Recently, however, polarization has pitted a radical minority of students against the government. But this minority has been successful in provoking large demonstrations because of general resentment and frustration with the Chun government. (Since assuming the Presidency, Chun has been plagued by financial scandals that have reached into his cabinet and his own family--the most recent one exploding last month--and undermined the credibility of his government's two major slogans: "eliminate corruption" and "build a just society.") President Chun's strong suit has been to associate himself with Korea's growing international stature and to act as the representative of the nation in world affairs. He has made several successful trips abroad, raising Korea's international prestige and symbolizing Korea's international prestige and symbolizing Korea's progress and emergence on the world state. Chun plans to be away during much of October on a busy itinerary of state visits in South-east Asia and Oceania President Reagan will visit Korea in November. These two events and the IPU conference should dominate the news from Seoul over the next few months. Perhaps because of the predicted unrest. KAL007 is beginning to recede from the headlines, even in Seoul.

As last week's bombing of the American Cultural Center in Taegu, the third largest city in South Korea, shows, the Philippines is not the only country on President Reagan's itinerary where some elements of the population view American support of the government as working against their interests. Only the tiniest minority of Korean citizens are truly anti-American, but a large portion of the population is now quite cynical about the American role in Korea's destiny. This cynicism is borne out of a rekindled national pride and frustration with Korea's insurmountable weakness in the face of superpower moves, like the KAL007 incident.

Karl Moskowitz is assistant professor of Korean History and Deputy Director of the Korean Institute.

'KAL 007 was a slap in the face that underscored Korea's weakness in the international arena and its continued dependence on the U.S. and, to a lesser extent, Japan. It is difficult for Koreans to believe that the Russians would have attacked a passenger jet from a more powerful nation such as the United States.