An Unsafe Missile Defense

After stalling for several years, Russia has fired a diplomatic volley back at the United States last month by ratifying both the START II strategic nuclear arms reduction treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in quick succession. Before we can all breathe a collective sigh of relief that these treaty approvals will soon bring about a sharp reduction in nuclear dangers, we need to assess the hurdles that remain. Many of these obstacles--especially a penchant for missile defense--are of the United States' own making.

Within two weeks of Russia's initiative, the U.S. has demonstrated a willingness to indefinitely prolong large nuclear arsenals despite the U.S. pledge for nuclear disarmament under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. U.S. plans for maintaining thousands of nuclear weapons and for altering the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to allow deployment of a limited national missile defense (NMD) system came to light in a leaked document that appeared in the New York Times on April 28.

The administration intends to direct NMD at so-called rogue nations such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, while many Republican leaders add China to that list. These possible threats are far from being manifest. Currently, none of these nations has a reliable long-range missile that could strike the U.S., and North Korea is the only one to have test-launched a long-range missile, which failed in its single launch attempt. Due to the efforts of Ambassador William Perry, North Korea has agreed to halt testing as long as negotiations with the U.S. proceed.

Only one nation--Russia--can destroy civilization as we know it in the U.S. Only one other nation--China--can readily increase its nuclear arsenal in response to U.S. missile defense. The U.S. should be more concerned now about reducing nuclear arms with those nations than about so-called rogues that present minimal nuclear threats.

Because the offense can more easily build weapons to counter the defense, the ABM treaty placed strict limits on missile defense, specifically preventing defense of a whole nation. It, therefore, set bounds on the nuclear arms race during the Cold War and continues to foster nuclear arms reductions.

Publicly, Russia opposes ABM treaty changes and has linked further nuclear arms reductions to preservation of the treaty. Administration officials, however, feel that with enough pressure, Russia will be amenable to treaty modifications.

The document leaked to the New York Times and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists reveals that the administration has repeatedly tried to reassure Russia that its nuclear deterrent will remain viable even after the final phase of the proposed NMD system, which could include up to 250 missile interceptors by 2010.

While this analysis provides some reassurance to Russia, which would probably be able to deploy more than 1,000 strategic warheads throughout the next ten years, such defenses are still dangerous. With a missile defense in the U.S., Russia will be more likely to keep its weapons on high alert, knowing that the U.S. can probably shoot down some of its warheads. This scenario increases the chances of an accidental nuclear war. In fact, the leaked document acknowledges that Russian nuclear weapons will remain on high alert.

Because Russia's nuclear weapons infrastructure continues to crumble, some American conservatives, such as Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), have argued that the U.S. does not need to pursue arms reduction treaties with Russia. Their arsenal can decay while we can keep a larger arsenal. Here again, this would be a mistake. Rather than force Russia to do whatever it can to maintain unsafe and unreliable warheads subject to accidental firing, the U.S. should pursue verifiable, guaranteed reductions.

Helms opposes any administration attempt to seek ABM Treaty modifications that could limit NMD and be coupled with further arms reductions. Texas Gov. George W. Bush has also stated that he would abrogate the treaty if Russia would not allow a missile defense of his choosing.

Unlike Russia, China realizes that NMD would directly threaten the viability of its nuclear deterrent, which includes only about 20 intercontinental ballistic missiles. Aside from taking the obvious step of potentially building up its nuclear arsenal in response to NMD, China has already taken diplomatic steps and could take other military steps in opposition. In October 1999, China joined forces with Russia in cosponsoring a United Nations resolution calling for adherence to the ABM Treaty. In February, China spoke out in the Conference on Disarmament about preventing an arms race in outer space. A Chinese missile buildup could fuel the arms race between India and Pakistan.

More than ten years after the Cold War, the U.S. needs to reevaluate what it has accomplished with the "gift of time" that nuclear activist Jonathan Schell '65 eloquently wrote about in 1998. Writing soon after news of the Clinton administration's nuclear war fighting plans trickled to the press, Schell noted the irony of the U.S., the strongest conventional military power, clinging to nuclear weapons for its security when the demise of the Soviet Union presented an opportunity for moving resolutely toward nuclear abolition.

President Clinton should delay a decision to deploy missile defense and seize the opportunity to achieve deeper arms reductions with Russia.

Charles D. Ferguson, a physicist, is director of the Nuclear Policy Project at the Federation of American Scientists.