Iran’s (Artistic) Ambitions

It is both popular and fashionable to say that the mastery of international relations is an art. After all, history has given us poignant dramas like the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre, yet also regrettable farces like the Munich Agreements of 1935, pompously presented by British Prime Minister Chamberlain as a symbol of “peace in our time.” However, a fallacy lies beneath this analogy: where ambiguous art is celebrated, countries with vague intentions certainly are not. The Islamic Republic of Iran is an actor that seems not to comprehend this impossibility. Its flirtatious relationship with nuclear proliferation has the dialectic of a Greek tragedy, and it might end as one worthy of Aeschylus, with extreme violence.

The background of this play is an international concordat, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. Despite banning further military atomic programs, a nowadays controversial article allowed for “peaceful uses” of nuclear technology. To many analysts’ concern, this Cold War brainchild has no way to differentiate responsible states from tyrannical failed ones. This year’s recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize is the United Nations (UN)-watchdog association that struggles to keep the treaty on stage, regardless of the loopholes.

The International Atomic Energy Association’s (IAEA) qualms with Iran were ignited by the 1979 Islamic Revolution that deposed the Shah and introduced theocracy under the unchecked control of an Islamic Ayatollah. Ironically enough, prior to that, and building up on the carnal relationships between the Shah and the White House, the U.S. government and German companies like Siemens were building reactors at locations like Bushehr. Today, the hands that work on that Persian coast site, or other buried research facilities like Natanz, are all but Western.

In its first major ambiguity, Teheran has cleverly mastered the use of Western terminology. Referring to ideals like “self-determination” and “inalienable rights” à la the UN, Iran claims the NPT is clear, and that no one is to interfere with their indigenous ambitions for cheaper, more efficient power. With similarly poetic rhetoric, the second-largest owner of oil fields in the globe tries to convince the international community that it only plans to “diversify” its energy interests. The “widening” Atlantic Ocean, Sharon’s health, Hamas’ victory, and other destabilizing international episodes bring manifold benefits to Ayatollah Khamenei. But most importantly, Iran’s administration receives 50% of its revenues from oil exports, and astronomical prices have dramatically boosted net income.

With that money, Iran can continue sustaining expensive deals with Russian contractors to build and operate the nuclear facilities. Yet again, the ambiguity of Washington’s past agreements with the Shah gives the Kremlin a fine rebuttal for any objection raised by the State Department. Moreover, Russian defense contractors, often antique leviathans from Soviet times, strongly pressure President Vladimir Putin not to succumb to “American interests” and to uphold Russian intransigency. Simply enough, Russia gets money, and Iran, nuclear technology.

But the greatest ambiguity materialized a few years ago, when an opposition group revealed Iran’s nuclear ambitions to the world after Teheran had spent years denying any such attempt. With a blink from the White House, Russia changed a crucial law in 2002, and offered Iran to take back the spent fuel, thus minimizing Teheran’s contact with fissile material. Despite intense negotiations, Teheran flirts with refusal, alleging that it would only perpetuate its dependency on foreign powers. Moreover, the IAEA has openly declared that some of Iran’s figures for fissile material stock simply do not match. Much like a 19th century classic novel, ghostly amounts of plutonium just vanish. The repeated efforts of the E3 (UK, France and Germany), known as “devils” in the Iranian propaganda circles, to cease Iranian fissile material enrichment has failed in several occasions. This has pushed Europe to a new stage position: referring Iran to the UN Security Council in search for “international action.” Whatever that entails remains, yet again, vague.

Without the clichéd finale of brining in a deus ex machina, the US and the European Union have several ways to reach the climax in this story, yet all share the recurring quality of ambiguity. The first one is the status quo: keep pressuring and negotiating with both Teheran and the Kremlin, and writing large checks for opposition groups from CIA accounts. In a time of urgency, however, this might seem like a more long-term project than Brussels or Washington are willing to accommodate.

The second alternative, referral to the Security Council, has gained strong approval as the chapters of this story unfold. Involving the supreme UN organ as well as the IAEA, would strengthen multilateral dialogue, in clear contrast with the monologue of preemptive ideology. Nevertheless, due to economic ties and resulting foreign policies, countries like China or Russia are unlikely to applaud such speeches, and their reluctance will only work for Teheran.

Finally, the third and most radical option would be a flashback to 1981 and the Israeli air strikes on Osirak, Saddam’s best shot at nuclear proliferation. The protagonist for such move could be not only the over-stretched U.S., but also Israel, the only nuclear power of the region, and a indefatigable antagonist of Teheran. Yet, such a move would assure full-fledged war with the theocracy, and the latter’s main power lies not in Shehab-3 missiles that can reach Jerusalem, but in the power it has over oil prices, everyone’s Achilles’ heel. Furthermore, leaders like Ayatollah Khamenei thoroughly enjoy dramatic victim roles on the international stage to further domestic support for their despotic dominance.

Evidently, this whole story is as ambiguous as Federico Fellini’s “8½” or the nature of the Mona Lisa “smile.” Iran moves from chapter to chapter, with clever rhetoric, cash-fluent promises, and hideous lies. Teheran is an actor playing on the edge in a genre as sensitive as nuclear proliferation. Hopefully, none of the protagonists will end this play with a bloody catharsis on a stage famous for endless crimson-blemished sands.

Pierpaolo Barbieri ’09, a Crimson editorial editor, lives in Thayer Hall.