Fourth Reich?

This editorial proposes no easy program for dealing with the resurgence of totalitarian nationalism in Germany. It will not say how the Occupation could have created from the ruins of the Third Reich a healthy and congenial community in Western Europe. It does say that the Allies have not built that sort of a Germany, and that England, France, and the U.S. must immediately coordinate the little control they still hold to prevent Germany from disrupting the security of the West.

The statistics released by the Bavarian Government last week document the shocking fact that former Nazi party members hold a majority of civil service posts in the more important state ministries. Anyone who read beyond the encouraging headlines on last summer's election for the first Federal Parliament knew the multitude of totalitarian splinter groups campaigning and electing in Bavaria. Yet last week, the Occupation lifted licensing regulations on political parties.

This was only the last of a long list of substantial concessions just granted to the German Government, concessions which were no doubt inescapable, on industry, foreign affairs, de-cartelization, shipping, and reparations. By making these concessions in time, the Allies hoped to strengthen the democratic regime. The plan misfired when Chancellor Adenauer attempted to claim all the credit for himself. By declaring himself opposed to discussing the program with the Social Democrats, he seriously weakened the prestige of parliamentary procedure and the validity of the contract. In protest, Opposition-leader Schumacher called Adenauer "Chancellor of the Allies," and was suspended from the House. Fortunately his party did not follow him, though its members share his belief that Adenauer has lost his independence and is dominated by ultra-conservative industrialist. They accuse him of accepting commercial and financial agreements with France in place of a genuine understanding between the two peoples.

Such as understanding appears less and less possible. In the November negotiations, the French had to drop their earlier demand that England supply a balance in Continental affairs to any strengthening of Germany. They see--as do the Germans--that England and the U.S. are bidding against the Russians for German friendship. They think the stakes are too high to play, since it will take a lot of yielding to match the Russian bid of a united Germany. They suspect a willingness in Britain and the U.S. to rearm Germany as an enemy of the East.

In recognizing Germany's importance in the "cold war," the U.S. and England must learn what the French know: it is terribly dangerous to strengthen Germany without knowing how that strength will be used. This consideration and no other must be first guide for future policy.