Atomic Fission

When congress established the Atomic Energy commission after the close of World War II, it had high hopes that the new agency could supervise the vital field of atomic energy in an atmosphere free from the turmoil that surrounds most government bodies. In the development of atomic energy for both military and peaceful purposes, the Commissions and controversy. Its five commissioners were to be chosen without regard to party and it was hoped that equal division of power would promote unanimity, or at lest harmony, in policy decisions.

In view of the significant and often delicate issues involved in the atomic field the non-political ideal is probably impossible to realize completely. Yet in the last year especially, the commission seems to have ignored this goal, plunging into polities with unmatched fervor. as a result of the controversies in which the agency has been engaged, Commissioners have become known by the polities they keep. Businessmen or scientists on the commission are popularly regarded as high-level lobbyists, and expected to uphold predetermined viewpoints on almost every issue.

On at least two major policy questions recently, the security program and the Dixon-Yates power contract, Commissioners have publicly and vocally disclosed their differences of opinion, pulling the Commission ever deeper into political conflict. Whatever the worth of the Dixon-Yates plan and the justice of the various security decisions, these complex problems have been handled in a manner that has shed heat, but not light, on the country at large. The Commission itself must share the responsibility for allowing such questions to turn into intense political controversies. Spectacles like last month's running dispute between Commissioners Strauss and Murray over whether the agency is doing its job properly are not likely to increase public or Congressional confidence.

The Commission may well sink even further into the political mire; full-scale development of atomic power for industrial purposes will challenge commissioners with potent new problems. Through its power over the licensing of atomic facilities, the allocation of atomic materials, and patent policy, the Commission will play a dominant role in determining the course of that development. Unless the agency recaptures public respect, its decisions can open the way for political brawling that will dwarf the Dixon-Yates struggle.

In quieter times, the Commissioners may be able to afford the luxury of personal vendettas. But important decisions lie ahead and feuding is a disservice to the nation.