Recognizing Red China

As tension and predictions of war rise in the Straits of Formosa, the United States finds it increasingly difficult to chart a realistic and honorable settlement. No statements about hope for peace--no matter how much they reassure the United States public and ease the immediate crisis--can cover up basic contradictions in U.S. Far Eastern policy. For the United States is at once attempting to support Chiang Kai-shek militarily, to keep the Western alliance together, and to negotiate a "modus vivendi"--to use the President phrase--with Communist China.

The small islands held by the Chinese Nationalists along the coastline of Communist China present the most pressing illustration of the conflicting aims of U.S. policy. Quemoy and Matsu, within the range of artillery from the mainland, could easily ignite a general conflagration. Here the dilemma is clear: in a sudden crisis, the U.S.--almost certainly without aid from her allies--could intervene to support Chiang's forces to untenable positions and a strong enemy. But either choice would be ruinous; war over indefensible islands without allied support would be folly in our own eyes and aggression in the eyes of the Asian neutrals. Yet abandonment of Chiang would appear as retreat from a victorious enemy. Negotiation is the only feasible solution. Bargaining involving surrender of strategically unimportant and militarily indefensible Quemoy and Matsu need not be appeasement if the U.S. gains some immediate benefits in return--such as the return of imprisoned U.S. flyers and a cease-fire in the Formosa Straits. Case-fire in itself would remove a sharp thorn from American relations with Britain and create a favorable climate for future negotiations on the larger stakes involved.

Diplomatic Recognition

For there are deeper issues in the struggle over Quemoy and Matsau. Red China eventually wants to assert its dominance in Asia, while the U.S. and its allies must at all costs contain Red China within its present boundaries. When military solutions leave the United States in an impossible predicament in Quemoy and Matsu, diplomatic weapons--still backed by rifles and regulars--must take precedence. One of the strongest weapons that the U.S. now has for negotiation is recognition of the Chinese Communist government. The United States should extend such diplomatic recognition as part of an over-all settlement and thus help cement the Western alliance, reassure the Asian neutrals, and offer an appealing bargaining point to the Chinese in return for important Communist concessions.

The continuing question of "Who Lost China" would indicate that some change has taken place in Asia; yet present policy seems to ignore the fact that Chiang Kai shek no longer rules over 500,000,000 Chinese. Like the ostrich who tries to wish away unpleasant facts by burying his head in the sand, the U.S. stubbornly continues to recognize the Nationalists as the government of China. Unfortunately the revolution is over, and Mao Tse-Tung has implanted in China a ruthless but stable regime. Almost every Asian expert--from professors to State Department advisers to private observers--agrees that the Red Chinese government is going to be around for a long time to come.

Since Mao's government is so firmly imbedded in China, diplomatic recognition of its existence is the only logical polity. Historically--with the exception of Wilson's "watchful waiting" policy in Mexico--recognition has not implied approval of a government, but cognizance of a fact. The U.S. hardly approves of the governments of the Soviet Union, Argentina, or Spain, but it recognizes them nonetheless.

There are important practical reasons, as well as legal precedents, for extending recognition to Red China. One main advantage to the U.S. would be a likely rise in U.S. prestige among neutral Asian nations. Newly independent Asians tend to look upon Chiang's government as a remnant of a corrupt, colonial past--a past that for them the Communist seem to have destroyed. Asian nations like India, Burma, and Indonesia should be more willing to listen to U.S warning about the dangers of Red China if they do not think we are clinging to a discredited past.

Sending a diplomatic mission to Pciping should also improve U.S. relations with nations which are already firmly inside the Western Alliance. Both Britain and Japan are pressuring for recognition and "normalization" of relations with the Communists. Within both nations strong anti-American elements are using the China issue to urge less cooperation with the United States. Recognition would destroy the force of such arguments.

Aside from possible benefits of a "listening post" within China, the offer of recognition would also provide a lever for negotiations. The British mistakenly extended recognition immediately, without seeking anything in return. Times have changed since China's rebuff to Britain; an offer of U.S recognition today would probably meet with Pciping's acceptance, especially since recognition would bring U.N. admission one step closer to Mao's government.

If U.S. recognition could be used to bargain with Red China, to unite the Western Alliance, and to reassure neutral Asian nations--in short, if sending diplomats to Peiping would help to case tensions in the Far East without sacrificing legitimate strategic interests of the United States, it seems surprising that Washington has not extended recognition before this. One of the chief objection has always been that the American public would not accept it. If President Eisenhower prepares the people slowly his great popularity can surely make the eventual diplomatic move acceptable. Other objections have been advanced, but none seems to survive close examination. Recognition would hardly undermine nearby Asian democracies or boost China as the "wave of the future." Not only do many Asian nations already have ties with Peiping, but U.S. recognition--as part of negotiated settlement--could appear as a tactical advance for the United States, Other objections often center around the problems of "Selling out" Chiang to Formosa and on Pciping's admission to the United Nations--both of which will be considered in tomorrow's editorial.

Recognition alone would certainly be valueless; only as a bargaining point in general negotiations would it bring any real advantage to the U.S. Once Red China is accepted diplomatically. America can get on with the job of building a Far Eastern policy that is bold and realistic.

(Tomorrow's editorial will discuss further problems, including Formosa and Red China's admission to the United Nations.)