Lord Harlech on Vietnam

Lord Harlech, formerly David Ormsby-Gore, comes to the Vietnam issue with rare credentials. A good friend of President Kennedy, he was ambassador to Washington throughout the New Frontier. Now, as deputy leader of the House of Lords, he is one of Ted Heath's "new men." Newsweek calls him "the Tory to watch," predicting that he will head the Foreign Office if and when the Conservatives are elected. He has had experience in the Far East, and advised JFK as well as his own government on the Laotian muddle. As a veteran disarmament negotiator and UN delegate, he has a subtle feel for the shifting balances of power politics. Finally, he has brains; Kennedy called him "the smartest man I've ever met."

Although Harlech is regarded in Britain as pro-American ("a US-symp" as one Labor critic says), his support for this country has never been unconditional. He pressed Kennedy to sign the Test Ban Treaty and advised the President bluntly that the CIA and State Department were handling Laos idiotically. He still loves to twit the State Department for its bureaucratic stodginess and lack of imagination. Harlech is no sycophant. But he seems to realize that his charm and intelligence allow him to cajole and convert effectively from the inside. Moreover, Harlech has a strong sense of Britain's dependence on America and thinks resentment of this relationship childish. The dependence is a fact, and as a realistic man he has learned to live with it.

Harlech toresees "increasing concern" in Britain over American policy, but does not believe this concern will crystalize into outright opposition to American goals or tactics. He finds Wilson's support for the President's position "sincere" and thinks that neither the Prime Minister's increased prestige nor England's increased solvency will tempt the Labor front bench to break with Washington on Southeast Asian policy. Harlech discounts the possibility that a left-wing revolt in the Labor Party will soon force Wilson's hand. No more than thirty MP's would back such a revolt, Harlech estimates, and Wilson enjoys a majority of 97.

This does not mean, however, that the English public is "keen" on the war. There is a general uneasiness, which is aggravated by Britain's fundamental disagreement with America over China policy. (Harlech is proud not only of the "sensibleness" but also of the consistency of Britain's China policy; he calls the French "Johnnies-come lately" to the idea of recognizing Peking. He believes the French view of the Vietnam situation is tainted by the fact that Paris has "old axes to grind" in that region.) If the war were to grow appreciably larger, dragging in China and placing severe strains on Russia, Lord Harlech believes the climate in Britain would quickly change from passive uneasiness to outspoken opposition. He does not, however, think such escalation is in the cards. China, Lord Harlech contends, would have to be pushed very hard before entering. A U.S. land invasion of North Vietnam or air strikes on Chinese bases would probably be required. The Chinese, be feels, realize that American air power could emasculate their armies before they reached the 17th parallel.

Thus, Lord Harlech envisions neither a major war nor an American defeat, unless America acts very incautiously. What he does foresee is a long, inconclusive struggle over relatively minor issues. There was good reason, he believes, to support Diem at the beginning. The man seemed vigorous and dedicated, and the entire population--not only the Catholic refugees from the North--seemed reluctant to accept Communist rule from Hanoi. But, partly because the U.S. failed to pressure Diem to jettison the Nhus, the political situation in South Vietnam is now thoroughly muddled. Harlech feels it is now time for the U.S. to concentrate its resources--political, diplomatic, and military--on one goal: getting out--with "honor," but also with some speed.

He favors this course not because he believes the war is "morally" wrong or because he thinks the U.S. is repeating the mistakes of "imperialism." His argument is less expansive: the war is poisoning U.S.-Russian relations. As long as it continues, the Soviets will find it politically impossible to negotiate seriously with the U.S. on two issues of paramount importance: nuclear disarmament and the strengthening of the UN's peace-keeping machinery. Lord Harlech does not make the simple claim that Europe is more "important" than the Far East. Rather he implies that progress toward a world-wide East-West detente is more important than the rather confused issues at stake in Vietnam.

Harlech's perspective on the crisis translates into a fairly straight-forward set of policy recommendations:

* The U.S. government should formally, though secretly, decide that it must be out of Vietnam in a finite amount of time: "Say nine months, though it might be more or less of course."

* The U.S. should state clearly and very concisely that its objective is a Vietnam devoid of U.S. troops and bases, enjoying a government chosen by free elections, held after a period of calm and supervised by some international authority.

* The State Department should secretly relay to Hanoi and the Viet Cong, through every possible channel, America's readiness to grant "concessions" at the conference table. Harlech emphasizes that "getting out" is more important than achieving "this or that advantage" in the negotiations.

* The U.S. should step up its military offensive against the Viet Cong in the South and should bomb targets in the North which would really cripple the economy: "You must make it clear to Hanoi that the alternative to negotiations, which would give them much, is very serious damage to their economy and a real pasting for the Viet Cong." Harlech strongly disagrees with Professor Galbraith's contention that a prolonged bombing pause, or a withdrawal into "enclaves," would convince Hanoi to talk: "The communists are quite primitive on these matters. If they think you are weakening, they will only press harder. They understand force."

Force plus concessions: it sounds a bit like Johnson's professed policy of "using both the dove and the hawk to bring peace with honor." But clearly Harlech feels that the U.S. has used insufficient force and insufficient concessions. There are those high in the Administration who agree with this view, Harlech contends, but understandably he cannot divulge their names.