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Eight Easy Steps

By Jordan Schreiber

A how-to guide to the confirmation process.

Claiming to know nothing about the Iran-contra scandal worked for Ronald Reagan and Oliver North. Will it work for Robert Gates?

ROBERT BORK WON'T get a second shot at the Supreme Court, but his nomination did not die in vain. His 1987 rejection by the Senate taught President Bush & Co. an important political lesson, and they now appear to have established some ground rules for getting Supreme Court nominees confirmed.

The trick is to choose candidates with little or no "paper trail" to reveal their opinions, then be sure that the testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee maintains that mystery. Put simply, pick mediocre nominees and make them keep their mouths shut.

By observing the current confirmation hearings for the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, we can develop some similar, albeit more complex rules for getting Robert Gates, a scandal-ridden spy, confirmed to head America's most secret organization:

(1) Praise the nominee.

This one is obvious.

People testifying on behalf of Gates must be careful to speak highly of him, and to make it clear that he is well-respected. For example, Alan Fiers, Jr., former head of the CIA's Latin American operations, testified that former CIA-director Bob Casey "had high regard for Bob Gates' abilities, he thought he was the best manager for the Agency."

Because Casey is conveniently dead, we'll have to take Fiers' word on this one.

(2) Find a scapegoat who is immune to harm.

Even the staunchest Ollie North supporters cheerfully blame him for Iran-Contra now. Charges against him were dropped last week and he can now afford to act as a buffer. Casey, too, is a welcome target, since he is even less likely than North to be indicted at this point.

Thus, Fiers stated that orders to conceal information from Congress came "much more likely [from] Casey than Bob Gates."

(3) Claim the nominee was unaware of the scandal.

Bobby Ray Inman, a former Deputy Director for Central Intelligence testified that certain activities were known only to people in specific departments, and thus "it is entirely feasible that there are areas that, yes, even the Deputy Director is excluded from." This line of defense prompts a question that was commonly asked in reference to Ronald Reagan.

Which is worse--to be ignorant of your agency's illegalities, or to be involved in their perpetuation?

(4) Be vague or incomprehensible.

Fiers expertly followed this rule as well. When Senate panelist David L. Boren (D-OK) asked him if Gates knew that a plane, shot down in Nicaragua in 1986, was part of "North's operation," Fiers babbled, "Not--I don't have any reason that would make me think he had the details or knew specifically that the plane was part of a North/White House operation, in specific detail...."

You get the point.

Gates himself followed this rule in a 1987 deposition when asked if he was aware of North's dealings with the contras. He replied, "In an advisory capacity, no, certainly not in an operational sense."

What?

(5) Develop amnesia.

This is certainly the most useful and most commonly exploited guideline. Throughout past testimony and in written answers to the Senate committee's questions last week, Gates claimed to have "no recollection" of numerous meetings and documents.

Now, forgetting that he'd been informed about the Iran-Contra scandal is somewhat more serious than, say, forgetting someone's birthday.

As Thomas Polger, an ex-CIA official put it, "I'd like to think... that when somebody tells me that some of my high-ranking colleagues are engaged in a felony, that's a conversation I would remember." This much recall ability is the least we should expect from someone who wants to serve as America's chief spy.

(6) Trivialize the scandal.

This is the What-we-did-wasn't-so-bad defense. Fiers used it twice, first when explaining why Gates failed to respond to North's mention of his Swiss bank accounts. He said, "[I]t was interesting, it was thought-provoking, intriguing, but not something you stopped and dwelled on...." In other words, what's so strange about having Swiss bank accounts? I do all my banking in Switzerland, don't you?

The second time Fiers attempted to trivialize Gates' guilt was when he discussed the "broad universe" of people who understand the extent of the CIA's activities. Fiers admitted that Gates was a member of this informed group, but said that was o.k. "because there were a lot of people in that universe." That is to say, Hey, Everybody's doing it.

But that certainly does not make the CIA's unconstitutional covert activities any more acceptable. This was no small scandal, and many share the guilt.

The Washington Post states, "Never before has the agency faced the possibility of so many career officers being investigated by a grand jury and prosecuted."

But the fact that the scandal engulfed so many people does not make any of them less accountable. There is, certainly, enough guilt to go around, and Gates deserves his share.

(7) Assert that the ends justify the means.

Fiers believes that we should ignore the Iran-Contra scandal because "the Nicaraguan policy, including the support to the contras, was fully successful." But Violeta Chamorro's eventual democratic election to the presidency of Nicaragua does not justify illegal support for guerrilla revolutionaries.

(8) Finally, bless the American people and their short attention span.

After five years, no one really wants to hear about Iran-Contra anymore. They view special prosecutor Lawrence Walsh's ongoing investigation as a tedious waste of tax dollars.

Senators hearing testimony about Gates therefore lack a great deal of enthusiasm, because it is always more politically profitable for them to concentrate on issues that interest the voters.

SO, HERE'S THE FORMULA: portray the nominee as a great guy who didn't do anything wrong, didn't know anyone else did anything wrong and doesn't remember exactly what he knew or did.

Also show that what was done wasn't that reprehensible, things turned out well, and no one really cares anyway.

All of this should be easy for Gates and his supporters to accomplish. After all, it's exactly what Reagan and North did five years ago.

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