Free Trade II.

The subject of Mr. Godkin's lecture last evening was the "Political Objection to Protection."

It must always be remembered that the reports of the custom-houses represent merely the purchase of individuals. If exports are exceeded by imports, the blame is often laid on the government, but in truth this excess is due merely to the effectual demand of individuals. It is not a matter of government. Therefore, for government to meddle herein is a very delicate proceeding, for it is in practice an interference of government with purely private affairs. Legislators are poor enough managers of their own affairs, and much poorer of the affairs of others. It must next be remembered that for political purposes the profitableness of foreign trade is conceded by a tariff; inasmuch as when a high tariff exists it implies a strong effective demand for foreign goods. The minority of the people at least wants a foreign trade, so that it is wrong to state absolutely that Americans are protectionists. This leads to a question as to the right of the majority to say when the minority shall buy or sell. We have not yet fixed the province of government to levy a tax more injurious to some than to others. Adam Smith would give government the care of the shools, religion, and certain trade monopolies. Mill would have the degree of government interference depend on history, social condition and character of people; general aim should be at non interference. Mr. Mill is about right. Whether a state shall control a farm, a railroad, or an industry, is to be decided by the character, moral, social and political.

Taxation for encouraging trade may be right, but is a tariff the best mode of imposing such taxation? Protective tariffs are to give certain profits to a certain class of producers, to compensate for certain losses. Now, as a rule, no tax is levied by Congress without giving the definite amount and purpose; but the matter of tariffs is an exception. Taxes levied for aiding manufacture are mixed up with other government expenses. Yet the people have a right to know all the particulars of taxation, "how much and what for." All national expenditures and taxes should be purely open matters. This blindness in the tariff system is one great evil. Another evil exists in a tendency of tariff legislation to corruption.

Suppose the direct distribution of monies, raised by appropriation in the usual way, to manufacturers suffering from competition. The evils of this method are evident. Yet the tariff system is in effect such a distribution. The manufacturers ask Congrees for aid by tariff, and usually get it. Only the protected manufacturers can be thus dependent. Yet tendencies to dependence are unquestionably corruptive. Protection was early proposed for the "infant" industries. Only lately was it advocated for perpetuity. American manufacturers have surely progressed; but still they seem to have grown no less dependent.

Our government is least suited of all for elaborate financial legislation. First, because we have no single financial minister: and our own appropriation bills are always greatly and wonderfully modified before passage: and second, because we pay our legislators, a circumstance which has naturally brought about the rule of the many by the comparatively poor. The pressure on these men from capitalists in all financial matters is very great. The financial committee is composed largely of business men, always ready to in crease their bank accounts. The only way to remedy this evil of corrupt legislation is by narrowing financial legislation as much as possible.

Tariff for revenue only is the only possible form, inasmuch as it is definite in sum and purpose, and is comprehensible to all. A protective tariff suiting all classes is utterly impossible.