The Hoffmann Plan

THE CURRENT impasse in the Middle East will not easily be broken. That there is no military solution in the area is manifest. That the future of shuttle diplomacy is at best dubious is also clear. Those who regard the existence of a strong and thriving Israel as an absolute necessity are compelled to search for a way to break the deadlock, particularly before Israel is again forced to sacrifice thousands. To retain a narrow field of vision and rely solely on the United States and on military strength would be both a dangerous and unrealistic policy for Israel to pursue. Though frequently it has seemed that few alternatives to this approach exist, when other policies are offered by those who support Israel they should be given serious consideration.

Stanley Hoffmann, professor of Government, visited Israel earlier this year at the invitation of Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and met with leading figures in Israeli politics. In the current issue of Foreign Affairs magazine. Hoffmann has published an article under the title. "A New Policy for Israel," which is worthy of close scrutiny both for its content and as a result of the attention it has received. Hoffmann's thesis is that the time has arrived for Israel to cease pinning all its hopes on a settlement imposed from without by the United States. Instead, he argues. Israel should go to Geneva seeking a negotiated peace treaty, and before doing, so make a bold "sweeping initiative" by outlining its final view of a settlement in the area.

Hoffmann suggests what features that final view should contain, but first it is important to examine his logic in proposing such a step, which runs directly counter to Israeli foreign policy since the end of the Six Day War. Almost everyone in Israel agrees that withdrawal to something like the pre-Six Day War boundaries has to happen eventually: therefore, if Israel would publicly acknowledge its readiness to return the occupied territories in Sinai and Golan in exchange for various guarantees of security and above all for recognition by Syria and Egypt, it would succeed in shifting the emphasis of the negotiations from the question of the occupied territories, to the Arab refusal to recognize Israel. In this way, he feels, Israel could end its isolation in the international community by declaring that it will take a step which most people consider inevitable in any case.

HOFFMANN'S VIEW of the final settlement--what he feels should be Israel's view--is withdrawal to the pre-1967 war boundaries, with modifications in Jerusalem, in return for recognition and security guarantees. He suggests that a step-by-step approach is possible only within the contest of a larger settlement, and offers his notion of possible guarantees: "For a long period both sides will have to be militarily separated. The aim ought to be the stationing in the Sinai, at Sharmel-Sheikh, in the Golan Heights, and in those portions of the Golan Heights, that are geographically closest to the Mediterranean, of international peace forces not composed of the superpowers. Should Washington and Moscow insist on having their own soldiers there--as a way of underlining their guarantees of the settlement--there should at least be soldiers of other powers. And there must be an agreement by all the parties, and all the contributors to the forces, against the arbitrary dismissal of the peace forces by one of the countries in which they are stationed, or the arbitrary removal of a national contingent by the country of origin."

In this way, Hoffmann would avoid the debacle of the United Nations Emergency Force, withdrawn from the Sinai in 1956 and 1967 at President Nasser's request, steps which resulted in war.

PERHAPS THE MOST interesting and provocative points in the entire plan concern the Palestinians. Hoffmann calls for self-determination for Palestinians on the West Bank and in Gaza, and says that Israel should be prepared to negotiate withdrawal from the West Bank with the PLO and thereby obtain de facto recognition. His notion, though somewhat ambiguous in the article, is for a Palestinian state on the West Bank, perhaps in Gaza. Thus he wants Israel to relinquish territory to the PLO for the creation of a Palestinian State, but does not demand that such a state, at the outset, recognize Israel: "It is foolish to expect at this stage or in the near future, any West Bank state to give up what Mr. Arafat calls his dream. It is always foolish to ask people to give up dreams. The essence of international relations simply consists in creating conditions in which those dreams cannot be carried out and the only way this can be done is a combination of Israeli strength, outside guarantees of Israel's borders, and some demilitarization of the West Bank state."

THIS PROPOSAL is exactly the kind which generally cause supporters of Israel to scoff. The thought of turning over territory to an organization which has dedicated itself to murdering Israeli civilians, without first requiring that that organization formally recognize Israel's right to exist would seem dangerous folly. But Hoffmann is suggesting such a development only in the context of a general settlement. In short, if Syria and Egypt recognize Israel, if the United States and the Soviet Union are joint guarantors of Israel's security, the PLO refusal to extend Israel recognition becomes irrelevant. Palestinian spokesmen themselves have acknowledged this point. In praising the Hoffmann plan earlier this week. M.T. Mehdhi, the head of the pro-PLO American Arab Action Committee in New York said. "With the establishment of such a state on the West Bank, we would renounce the use of force against Israelis. We would hope that Israel and the Palestinians state would eventually become one, but if the Palestinians are, in twenty years, satisfied with their lot, then we would say good luck to them both."

Hoffmann said this week that renunciation of the use of force by the Palestinians would be the minimum that Israel could expect. He also said that the West Bank could be developed into a viable state, noting that it is agriculturally fertile: "Who would have thought that pre-1947 Jordan would be viable?" One of Hoffmann's major points, which he emphasized in his interview with the Crimson, is that he is not suggesting that Israel withdraw to the pre-june 5, 1967 boundaries and then see what happens. He is suggesting that Israel propose a withdrawal, agree to deal with the PLO, and come to some sort of dual capital agreement concerning Jerusalem, only if the Arab states, particularly Egypt and Syria, agree to the various security guarantees and to recognize Israel. One of his most compelling points is that "a bold Israeli initiative would restore Israeli diplomatic position, and make it far more difficult for Israeli's critics in the United States to argue that the responsibility for the deadlock is evenly divided or even largely Israel's."

M.T. Mehdi said the Hoffmann plan was "a step forward in the area," and a Cairo English language newspaper reprinted part of the Foreign Affairs article, "without distortion" according to Hoffmann. In the United States, the plan has been heralded and reprinted on The New York Times oped page, and praised in Time magazine. Indeed the influence of such a plan on policy makers in Washington cannot be overestimated. Which perhaps explains why the official Israeli response, as articulated by the embassy in Washington is that the plan is "totally unworkable and fails to take into account the causes of previous wars." One cannot but be sympathetic to Israel's point, since the roots of past aggressive actions by Egypt were obviously not the recapture of lost territory, but the destruction of the state entirely.

Hoffmann's response to this point is that Israelis are so "traumatized" by their wars, that they fail to take seriously present demands. He again pointed out that his plan could be carried out in stages, and is directed at ensuring Israeli security. He added that he found Israelis very divided on his last visit, and that he feels there has been considerable evolution on the Palestinian question within the last year. Hoffmann noted that he did not expect the Israeli to immediately adopt the plan when he proposed it, but simply felt it should be articulated.

By extending support to Hoffmann's plan in principle, one is not necessarily endorsing all of his conclusions. His direct implication that many who support Israel have used the Nazi holocaust as political blackmail is unfair. Those Israelis who speak of the Holocaust of European Jewry in the context of the current crisis, do so, for the most part, not to be awarded the moral right to do anything they please, but to remind the world that their fears are not without historical foundation, a reminder sorely needed.

But Hoffmann's plan may prove to be Israel's best hope, and Israel's as well as Americans should study it closely.