Reading Into '86

Republican loss of the Senate is the big story of the 1986 elections. The change in Senate control probably will have important consequences for Ronald Reagan in particular, and the course of public policy in general. But the political and governmental consequences of elections often occur against a backdrop of little underlying change in electoral sentiment. That is the real story of 1986, a story unlikely to get much play in the wave of postelection commentary.

Contemporary representatives are independent political entrepreneurs who emphasize consensual issues and constituency service. Over the course of the past three decades personal staffs have multiplied, district office operations have burgeoned, and members have expanded their personal presence in their districts. Providing assistance to constituents, interest groups and local government units in their dealings with the federal bureaucracy is a non-partisan, non-ideological and largely non-controversial activity that enables modern representatives to convert some who would otherwise oppose them on partisan or ideological grounds.

This development and the general deterioration of partisan ties in the electorate have combined to insulate House elections from national forces. Presidential coattails have weakened greatly since the 1930s. Moreover, the state of the economy and other national conditions no longer affect House elections as strongly as in earlier eras. Consider that in the recession year of 1938 Roosevelt's Democrats lost 71 seats, in the recession year of 1958 Eisenhower's Republicans lost 48 seats, and in the recession year of 1982 Reagan's Republicans lost 26 seats. The five seat Republican loss of 1986 epitomizes the modern pattern of incumbent insulation. "All politics is local" exaggerates, but not much in the case of modern day House elections.

But what of the Senate? Senators play in the riskier game than representatives. Between the higher prestige of the office and the scarcity of opportunities to achieve it, Senate races attract stronger challengers. Senators also are more newsworthy. Unlike representatives, they do not themselves provide the bulk of the information that constituents receive. Moreover, Senators are expected to maintain a higher profile on the great issues of the day. For all these reasons Senators face tougher elections than modern representatives.

When the Democrats lost 12 seats in 1980 many saw historic significance in the election returns. Prominent Democratic liberals fell before conservative Republican challengers, contributing to speculation about right turns and electoral realignments. The 1986 Republican loss of eight seats undoubtedly will fuel counter-speculation about aborted realignments and receding conservative tides. But in 1986 as in 1980 there was less than meets the eye in the Senate returns.

To put the 1986 Democratic gains in the proper perspective, we must first consider their 1980 losses. In that year incumbent defeats in divisive primaries, scandal, and infirmity account for five seats. The defeats of prominent liberals like Bath, Church, Culver, Durkin, McGovern and Nelson were the basis of the grand interpretations of the outcomes. But as a class these were exceedingly vulnerable candidates. Excepting Nelson, their average vote in the preceding election was 53 percent, and their previous election was 1974--the most disastrous Republican year in a generation. In short, these liberal Senators were living on borrowed time. Had 1974 been a normal year, they probably would not have been around to lose in 1980 and invest that election with its seeming significance. As for what defeated them in 1980, given their precarious positions, everything was important no matter how small--Reagan coattails, the efforts of the NCPAC and a conservative resurgence on the one hand, or candidate personalities and local issues on the other.

What is almost universally overlooked about the 1980 Senate elections is that the Democrats outpolled the Republicans nationwide by about three million votes. The aggregate national vote division was 53 percent to 47 percent in favor of the Democrats. For winning close races in smaller states the Republicans deserved credit for effective campaigning, but not coronation as a new majority.

In 1986, the shoe was on the other foot. Republican incumbents, who won by narrow margin in 1980, were seeking re-election in less favorable times. With so many poised so close to the brink it came as no surprise when many of them went over. But collectively, the Democrats led the Republicans nationally by less than half a million votes, taking just over 50 percent of the total vote. The Democrats lost 12 seats with 53 percent of the national vote in 1980; they won eight seats with less than 51 percent of the vote in 1981. In seats, 1986 was a Republican calamity as 1980 was a Democratic disaster. In votes, 1986 provides no more basis for proclaiming an end to a conservative resurgence than 1980 provided for proclaiming a beginning.

The bottom line is that the American electorate remains dealigned--not realigned, predominantly moderate, not liberal and conservative. During the 1960s and 1970s, Democrats dissipated a generation's worth of political capital, but during the 1980s Republicans have failed to capitalize on their opportunity. The 1986 Congressional elections only affirm the stand-off.

MORRIS P. FIORINA is a professor of Government. He has authored four books on national elections, and currently serves as chairman of the board of overseers of the National Elections Studies. He is teaching "Government 30: Introduction to American Government" this fall with Professor James Q. Wilson.