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The Draft: Benefits--for the Future

Administration Proposals May Shorten Time in Service For Younger Students, But Meanwhile Undergraduates Face Increased Draft Calls and Much Stiffer Regulations Concerning Participation in Reserves After Active Duty

By J. ANTHONY Lukas

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Congressional sources differed this week about the chances of the Administration's new military manpower proposals, but there was general agreement here that while the program would in some ways benefit future students, it may make things a little tougher for those now in college.

The chief effect of the Administration's proposals on present college students would be much stricter requirements of participation in the reserves after active service. These requirements, however, are a controversial aspect of the new program and may be modified by Congress.

In addition, it is becoming clear that draft calls will be going up again in the near future. By August, Selective Service expects to be calling at least 23,000 men a month, as compared to the present 11,000 monthly calls, and some believe that calls may even go as high as 50,000 next fall. It is not now believed that Formosa will affect the draft totals.

The new manpower program as spelled out in a series of recent announcements from the White House and the Pentagon is this:

1) A cut in the size of the armed forces from the present 3,200,000 to 3,000,000 by June 30, 1955 and to 2,850,000 by June 30, 1956. The slice would come most heavily in the Army, with a drop of 74,000 men this year, while the Air Force will increase by about 14,000.

2) A sweeping new National Reserve Plan which calls for a greatly strengthened reserve system. The most discussed feature of this plan is the special six-month training program.

3) Extension of the present draft system, administered by General Lewis B. Hershey, for another four years.

Most controversial of the three, of course, is the new Reserve Plan. But this plan follows as a corollary of the Administration's overall defense strategy as exemplified by the cut in the armed forces and the 1956 budget which provides almost half of the 34 million dollar defense budget for the Air Force.

The strategy implemented by the new proposals is one which puts increasing emphasis on the nuclear power of the Air Force as the principal deterren of aggression. With such a reliance on the threat of "massive retailiation," there is clearly less need for a large standing army. The Defense Department has been saying for some time that it would like to build up a large reserve and thus be able to cut the size of the standing army.

There are some here who feel the Administration has made a mistake in the presentation of its new manpower proposals. They point out that the new Reserve Plan might have had a much better chance if the Administration had said to Congress, "Look, we'll be able to cut the size of the standing army forces, if you provide for a stronger reserve system." Instead, the cut in the armed forces was announced first and then the Administration presented its Reserve Plan.

Draft Calls Should Rise

The general opinion, however, is that some kind of new draft and reserve law will come out of Congress this session, but there is little agreement on just how much of the Administration's program Congress will accept.

Virtually certain is Congress' approval of an extension of the Selective Service Act of 1951 which provides for the regular draft.

The expectation of higher calls under the draft stems from the fact that the present 11,000 calls are aimed at cutting down the size of the armed forces. When those forces reach the required level, they will have to be maintained, which will require larger calls. In addition, it is expected that for a number of different reasons the enlistment rate is going to drop off in the next few months. Among these are 1) the expectation of continuing lower draft calls, 2) anticipation of the new reserve programs, and 3) recent termination of educational benefits under the G.I. bill of rights.

As for the new Reserve Plan, nobody here expects it to have easy sledding in Congress. It is still too early to make predictions. Neither the House nor Senate Armed Services Committees has yet scheduled hearings on the bill and it is at these hearings, which may last several months, that the real strength of the opposition will be shown.

UMT or Not UMT

It is generally agreed, however, that the bill has a considerably better chance in the Senate than in the House. This is because the label of Universal Military Training has already attached itself to the bill and the House has been shown to be much more vulnerable to anti-UMT pressure groups. Such, for instance, is the Methodist Church, whose Board of World Peace has already come out against the bill on the basis that it is a form of UMT.

Carter Burgess, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, said, in an interview with the CRIMSON, that the Defense Department does not consider the new plan Universal Military Training. It is distinguished from UMT, he said, by the fact that it is limited in time (it will expire in four years) and in scope.

The aspect of the plan which has chiefly drawn the charge of UMT is, of course, the provision for direct entry into the Reserve Forces with only a six-month training period. Under this plan, a militarily qualified man between the ages of 17 and 19 could, by entering a ten-year military obligation in the reserve of the Army, Marine Corps or Coast Guard, or in the Army National Guard, serve only six months of actual training. After this he would serve for nine and a half years in the Ready Reserves.

Such a program would be subject to strict quotas established by the President on recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The quota set for the first year is 100,000. While in training program, trainees will get $30 a month.

4 Down, 51/2 to Go

The fact is that there is nothing very radical about this aspect of the bill. In the 1948 Selective Service Act there was a similar provision which allowed enlistment for one rather than the regular two year service compensated for by one year longer in the reserves. This was not utilized to any extent by the Defense Department.

The present program would enable a high school graduate to take a six-month training period and then enter college, during which he would be required to attend something like 48 drills per year and a two week summer camp per year. On graduation from college, he would have fulfilled not only his tour of active service but also four out of his nine and a half years in the Ready Reserves.

In Time for '59

Since the bill will almost certainly not be passed before June and probably will not go into effect until later in the year, few present college students will be eligible for this program since they will have passed the age of 19. It is possible, however, that the program will be readied in time for the class of '59 to take advantage of it.

The hitch in the plan, of course, is the long-term obligation in the Ready Reserves. This means that if a man should fail to participate in the drills and summer camps he could be called back to serve out his additional year and a half on active duty. There is some feeling here that a requirement of nine and a half years of active reserve duty is too much, and some adjustment may be made in this by Congress.

First to Be Called

But the objection to the reserve demands on the six-month trainee will probably be much less than to the six year reserve requirements on the regular two-year inductee or enlistee. There is strong feeling that a man who serves two years of active duty, particularly in combat, should not be required to serve for six years in the Ready Reserve in which he not only must participate in training but is the first to be called back in time of war.

One of the chief objections to the plan will probably be that it fails to create a truly non-veteran reserve. The need for a non-veteran reserve became painfully obvious in the Korean war when many of the men who were being called to serve were World War II veterans participating in Ready Reserve units. Ever since then the need has been recognized for the development of a system under which the Ready or "Service Callable" Reserve would be composed of trained, but non-veteran, troops.

This plan partially accomplishes that end, but not wholly. While it would add 100,000 non-veterans to the Ready Reserve each year, the bulk of the Ready Reserves would be composed of men who have served for two years.

The new plan in this respect merely adds teeth to the reserve requirements of the 1951 Selective Service Act. Under that act, all inductees or enlistees contract for an eight-year military obligation. After serving two-years a man still is supposed to serve six years in a Ready Reserve unit. In practice, however, there are no teeth in the act which can force him to attend training. The new bill would add compulsion by providing that men who refuse to participate in required training will be subject to loss of retirement or promotion benefits and to discharge under conditions "other than honorable" at the end of the military obligation.

It is certain that this feature of the bill will get a careful going-over by the congressional committees, and reserve obligations may very well be modified.

The new plan provides that service in the Ready Reserve will vary with the time spent on active duty. Thus, if a man spends two years on active duty he will be in the Ready Reserve. If he serves three years he will be in the Ready Reserves four years and in the Standby or "Selectably Callable" Reserve for one year. For four years active duty he would serve two years in both, and for five years three in the Standby.

The distinction between the Ready and Standby Reserves is that the first will be subject to immediate call to active duty in a war or national emergency declared by the Congress or proclaimed by the President; Standby Reserves will be subject to call only in a war or emergency declared by Congress. In a period of so-called limited or "brush-fire" wars this distinction is an important one.

Four Alternatives

On the basis of the planned strength of the Armed Forces, it is estimated that the Ready Reserve should be roughly 2,900,000 and the Defense Department hopes to reach this goal by June, 1960. The minimum requirement for the Standby Reserve is 820,000.

There is one other new program provided by the bill, which would enable men between 17 and 19 to enlist directly in the reserves of the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps for a period of eight years, with the understanding that they will be called to serve a minimum of two years active service within 24 months of enlistment.

If the bill passes, then, there will be four ways for a young man to fulfill his military obligations: 1) he may wait for induction; 2) he may enlist in one of the regular armed services for three, four or six years; 3) he may enlist in the special Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps Reserve program, or 4) he may enlist in the six-month training program

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